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ARTICLES
CONFRONTING DEATH: SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS AT
CAPITAL SENTENCING
John G. Douglass*
Trial rights are different from sentencing rights. The Supreme Court
has ruled that some Sixth Amendment rights (the right to counsel) apply at
sentencing, while others (the right to a jury, the right to confront witnesses)
do not. Because some rights are "in" at sentencing, and some are "out," the
Court's recent terms have been consumed with cases-from Apprendi v.
New Jersey, to Ring v. Arizona, to Blakely v. Washington, and finally
to United States v. Booker-that struggle to draw the line between trial
and sentencing. This Sixth Amendment line drawing is especially troublesome in death-penalty cases, where the Eighth Amendment already divides
sentencing into eligibility issues and selection issues. As things now stand,
the Court applies parts of the Sixth Amendment to parts of a capitalsentencing proceeding. The unfortunate result is a confused doctrine that often
calls for conflicting constitutionalstandardsin a single sentencing. In this
Article, I argue that the basic premise of these Sixth Amendment cases is
misplaced when it comes to capital sentencing. Drawing on the history of
unified trials in the era of the Framers, where guilt and death were determined simultaneously by a single jury verdict in a trialwith full adversarial
rights, I argue that the whole of the Sixth Amendment applies to the whole of
a capital case. At the time of the framing, popularresistance to mandatory
death penalties contributed heavily to the birth of the adversarialrights we
now see in the Sixth Amendment. The Framers knew nothing of a "guilt"
phase and a "penalty"phase. They crafted the Sixth Amendment not only to
protect the innocent from punishment, but also to protect the guilty from
undeserved death.
INTRODUCTION

Modern criminal prosecution spans two worlds: first a trial, then a
sentencing. In capital cases, we know these two worlds as the "guilt"
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. I am indebted to Paul
Marcus and Carol Steiker for their helpful comments on an earlier draft, and to my
colleagues Ron Bacigal and Corinna Lain for their insights. Two of my students deserve
special thanks: Kelli Hall Branham asked the key questions that started this project, and
Ryan Frei provided exceptional research assistance at every step.
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phase and the "penalty" phase. Whatever we choose to call them, we treat
them as separate universes, governed by very different rules.1
Trial is an adversarial process, conducted under rules set out in a
single sentence of the Sixth Amendment. 2 The defendant gets a speedy
and public trial, before ajury, with notice of the charges, the assistance of
counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine government witnesses,
and the right to call witnesses on his own behalf. An elaborate body of
precedent defines each of these Sixth Amendment rights, leaving us with
the highly structured, adversarial world of criminal trials. For good measure, Congress, state legislatures, and the courts have created a law of
evidence that further refines what happens in the world of a criminal
trial.
The sentencing world is a different kind of place: an informal, freeflowing world with few hard rules. Granted, some elements of the adversarial process inhabit the world of sentencing. 3 But few "trial rights" survive intact after a guilty verdict, 4 and some do not survive at all. 5 Indeed,
most sentencings take place without any witnesses. 6 When witnesses are
called, the rules of evidence typically do not apply. 7 At best, a defendant's "sentencing rights" are a faint shadow of his "trial rights."
1. In the modern lexicon of Supreme Court discourse, we might refer to the world of
trial as "Apprendi-land." Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 613 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Beginning with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the Court's efforts to define
the Sixth Amendment border between the land of trial and the land of sentencing have
caused major upheavals in sentencing practices in noncapital cases, leading ultimately to
the invalidation of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (Federal Sentencing
Guidelines) and similar guideline sentencing systems in the states. See United States v.
Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 759-64 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2537-38
(2004). As I suggest later in this Article, the tremors from Apprendi, Ring, Blakely, and
Booker are just beginning to be felt in death-penalty sentencing. See infra Part lI.D.
2. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
3. See, e.g., Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967) (holding that Sixth Amendment
right to appointed counsel extends to sentencing). For a comprehensive catalogue of
cases applying, or refusing to apply, "trial rights" at sentencing, see Alan C. Michaels, Trial
Rights at Sentencing, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 1771 (2003).
4. See infra Part I.A-B.
5. For example, there is no Sixth Amendment right to be sentenced by a jury.
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984).
6. In the typical, noncapital sentencing, the court relies on a presentence report
prepared by a probation officer and submitted to the parties for review, comment, or
objection prior to sentencing. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3552 (2000).
7. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 1101 (d) (3) (providing that rules of evidence do not apply in
sentencing hearings); Fla. Stat. § 921.141(1) (2004) (providing that probative evidence is
admissible at capital sentencing hearings "regardless of its admissibility under the
exclusionary rules of evidence"). One researcher found that nineteen death-penalty states
did not apply their rules of evidence to capital sentencing hearings, while seventeen states
applied their rules to at least part of the capital sentencing process. Robert Alan Kelly,
Applicability of the Rules of Evidence to the Capital Sentencing Proceeding: Theoretical
& Practical Support for Open Admissibility of Mitigating Information, 60 UMKC L. Rev.
411, 457 (1992).
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This division of criminal cases into two distinct worlds with different
rights holds true even in capital cases, where the purpose of the sentencing hearing is to determine who lives and who dies. While the Supreme
Court insists that the requirements of due process are heightened at capital sentencing, 8 it is hard to discern a constitutional difference between
procedural rights at noncapital sentencing and the "heightened" protections the Court accords to capital sentencing. 9 Instead, the Court has
been quick to note that due process, even at capital sentencing, does not
"implicate the entire panoply of criminal trial procedural rights." 10
Unfortunately, the Court has never articulated a coherent theory for
identifying which of the rights in the Sixth Amendment "panoply" apply
at capital sentencing and which do not. Despite its affinity for textual
analysis in other realms of Sixth Amendment law,11 the Court has never
answered the basic textual question whether the Sixth Amendmentwhich applies "in all criminal prosecutions"-applies to capital sentencing at all. And while today's Court looks to the world of the Framers to
resolve other Sixth Amendment issues, 12 its decisions regarding adversarial rights at capital sentencing rest on scant historical analysis that
highlights nineteenth-century practice while largely ignoring the forces at
3
play when the Sixth Amendment was conceived.'
Rather, through an approach best described as fragmentary, the
Court has ruled some trial rights "in" and some rights "out" at capital
8. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (stating that since "the
penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment ... there is a
corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is...
appropriate"). The notion of heightened procedural reliability in capital sentencing stems
from the Court's statements that "death is different" from other forms of punishment and
therefore requires more reliable procedures at sentencing. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan
M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional
Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 355, 370-71 (1995) [hereinafter
Steiker & Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts].
9. For an account of the relatively few cases where the Court has invoked the notion
of heightened reliability to address procedural rights at capital sentencing, see Carol S.
Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Judicial Developments in Capital Punishment Law, in
America's Experiment with Capital Punishment 47, 64-65 (James R. Acker et al. eds.,
1998) [hereinafter America's Experiment]; Steiker & Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts,
supra note 8, at 397-98.
10. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 n.9 (1977).
11. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (holding that phrase
"'witnesses' against the accused" in the Confrontation Clause bars "testimonial" hearsay
offered by the prosecution); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972) (interpreting
Sixth Amendment reference to "criminal prosecutions" to mean that right to counsel
attaches only upon commencement of adversarial judicial proceedings); cf. Maryland v.
Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 861 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (decrying "subordination of explicit
constitutional text to currently favored public policy").
12. See, e.g., Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42-50 (relying on history to conclude that
Confrontation Clause excludes hearsay akin to "ex pane examinations" in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 56-59 (discussing Court's limited historical
analysis in Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 & nn.4-5 (1949)).
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sentencing. The Court has repeatedly rejected the claim that the Sixth
Amendment creates a right to jury sentencing in capital cases.14 In Williams v. New York, it declined to apply the right of confrontation to limit a
sentencing court's use of uncross-examined hearsay in sentencing a defendant to death, 15 though-without mentioning the Sixth Amendment-it has ruled that courts may not impose a death sentence based on
secret information never disclosed to the defendant. 16 By contrast, the
Court readily applies the right to appointed counsel at sentencing hearings1 7 and defines "effective assistance" at sentencing just as it does at
trial.1 8 As for the rest of the rights listed in the Sixth Amendment, the
Court has said little. Today, the best answer to the question, "Does the
Sixth Amendment apply at capital sentencing?" is, 'Yes" (right to counsel), "No" (right to jury), and "Maybe" (everything else). Lower courts
have responded with their own array of confusion, disagreeing about
questions as fundamental as, "Does the right of confrontation apply at
capital sentencing?"1 9 Through it all, the Court has never attempted to
20
put the Sixth Amendment pieces together into a coherent whole.
14. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 647-49 (1990); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494
U.S. 738, 745 (1990); Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 640 (1989); Spaziano v. Florida, 468
U.S. 447, 464 (1984); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 (1976).
15. 337 U.S. at 251-52. Because it was a state prosecution predating the Warren
Court era of "selective incorporation," Williams is not explicitly a Confrontation Clause
case. See infra note 54.
16. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 360 (1977).
17. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967).
18. Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 201-04 (2001); Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
19. Compare Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 398 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that
Confrontation Clause "applies through the finding of guilt, but not to sentencing, even
when that sentence is the death penalty"), with United States v. Fortier, 911 F.2d 100, 103
(8th Cir. 1990) (applying confrontation right even to noncapital sentencing under Federal
Sentencing Guidelines), overruled by United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 401 (8th Cir.
1992) (en banc). For examples of courts explicitly commenting on this confusion, see
United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 324 (4th Cir. 2003) ("It is far from clear that the
Confrontation Clause applies to a capital sentencing proceeding."); cf. United States v.
Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1103 n.19 (3d Cir. 1990) ("We hope... that the Supreme Court
in the near future will decide whether confrontation clause principles are applicable at
sentencing hearings ....").
20. Likewise, there has been relatively little scholarly commentary on Sixth
Amendment rights at capital sentencing. Prominent scholars have criticized the lack of
substance to the Court's notion of heightened procedural safeguards at death sentencing.
See, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts, supra note 8, at 360, 397-402. Most
commentary on capital sentencing and the Sixth Amendment has gone the way the Court's
decisions in Apprendi and Ring have led: into a debate centered on the jury right and
concerned with drawing the line between trial and sentencing in capital cases. See
generally Thomas Aumann, Note, Death by Peers: The Extension of the Sixth
Amendment to Capital Sentencing in Ring v. Arizona, 34 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 845 (2003); Marc
R. Shapiro, Note, Re-Evaluating the Role of the Jury in Capital Cases After Ring v. Arizona,
59 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 633 (2004). Among the many comments on Ring, only
Professor Carol Steiker's explicitly recognizes Ring's potential application beyond the jury
right to Sixth Amendment rights more generally. See Carol S. Steiker, Commentary,
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Instead, for more than a decade, the Court has struggled with a question that is unavoidable when we have two Sixth Amendment worlds:
Where should the border be drawn between trial and sentencing? In capital litigation, the Court's most recent effort to clarify that border is Ring
v. Arizona.2 1 Ring deals explicitly with only one Sixth Amendment right:
the right to a jury trial. But its reasoning applies equally to the entire
range of Sixth Amendment rights, including the rights of confrontation
and compulsory process.2 2 The Sixth Amendment border therefore determines not just who decides the critical facts that may lead to a death
sentence, but what information the sentencer may rely upon and how it
23
may be presented.
Unfortunately, despite the obvious significance of the Sixth Amendment border between trial and sentencing, its location has proven hard
to fix. Ring attempts to draw a bright line, assigning death-eligibility
factfinding to the jury, while leaving the ultimate exercise of sentencing
discretion-the selection process-beyond the reach of the Sixth Amendment. 24 But as Ring itself demonstrates, the constitutional border does
not always line up with the division of factfinding labor established in
many death-penalty statutes. Most states address both eligibility and selection in a single penalty phase. 2 5 In those jurisdictions, at least when it
comes to the hearsay rules imposed by the Confrontation Clause, Ring
may call on courts to apply two different constitutional standards in the
same proceeding. 26 Even more troublesome, because prosecutors have
Things Fall Apart, But the Center Holds: The Supreme Court and the Death Penalty, 77
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1475, 1481-82 (2002) [hereinafter Steiker, Things Fall Apart] ("If the Sixth
Amendment right to ajury trial applies to aggravating circumstances, what about the Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause?").
In the arena of noncapital sentencing, there has been significant interest in the topic
of Sixth Amendment rights, especially the right of confrontation, and especially in the
process of sentencing under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale,
Procedural Issues Raised by Guidelines Sentencing: The Constitutional Significance of the
"Elements of the Sentence," 35 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 147 (1993); Note, An Argument for
Confrontation Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1880, 1888-91
(1992) [hereinafter Note, An Argument for Confrontation].
21. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 192-196.
23. The Confrontation Clause not only guarantees the right to cross-examine
prosecution witnesses, Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-18 (1974), but also limits the use
of hearsay by prosecutors, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42-69 (2004).
24. Ring, 536 U.S. at 597, 609.
25. See Shapiro, supra note 20, at 647-51 (discussing Ring's impact on states formerly
employing "strict judicial sentencing" and "hybrid sentencing schemes"). In the wake of
Ring, three states-Delaware, Montana, and Nebraska-adopted sentencing procedures
that call for jury determination of death-eligibility factors followed by a selection process
where the judge ultimately determines the sentence. Id. at 650-51. In effect, these states
have trifurcated capital cases.
26. In at least one federal case, the court has proposed to divide capital sentencing
into distinct eligibility and selection phases, specifically in order to accommodate differing
restrictions on hearsay under the Confrontation Clause. See United States v. Jordan, 357
F. Supp. 2d 889, 903-04 (E.D. Va. 2005).
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some range of discretion in choosing which facts to allege in establishing
death eligibility and which to leave to the selection process, a defendant's
right to jury determination of a critical fact, or his right to cross-examine
27
a critical witness, can turn upon the tactical choices of his adversary.
Few constitutional protections are so malleable when the stakes are so
high.
To heap complexity upon complexity, the Court's recent decisions
in Blakely v. Washington 28 and United States v. Booker29 may have shifted the
Sixth Amendment border in subtle ways that courts have yet to explore in
the context of capital sentencing. But lost in the formalistic line drawing
of Ring, Blakely, and Booker is a more fundamental Sixth Amendment
question, a question the Court has not addressed seriously in a capital
case for more than fifty years: Why draw a line at all?
This Article addresses that fundamental question. The Court's fragmentary approach has taken pieces of the Sixth Amendment and applied
them to pieces of the capital sentencing process. I contend that the
whole of the Sixth Amendment applies to the whole of a capital case,
whether the issue is guilt, death eligibility, or the final selection of who
lives and who dies. In capital cases, there is one Sixth Amendment world,
not two.
In this Article, I argue for a unified theory of Sixth Amendment
rights to govern the whole of a capital case. Because both Williams and
the Apprendi-Ring-Booker line of cases purport to rest on an originalist interpretation of the Sixth Amendment, my thesis relies largely on history,
a history that today is well documented by leading legal historians30 but
has been ignored or misread by the Court in fashioning its separate world
of capital sentencing rights. Two aspects of that history are central to my
argument: (1) unitary capital trials conducted as full adversarial proceedings, and (2) jury verdicts that determined life or death.
Unitary capital trials were the norm when the Sixth Amendment was
created.3 1 The question of guilt and the question of death both were
decided in a single jury verdict at the end of a single proceeding conducted as an adversarial trial. Bifurcation-separating the guilt determination from the choice of an appropriate penalty-was a procedure that
evolved after the founding, initially for noncapital sentencing. Bifurca27. See infra Part II.C.
28. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).

29. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
30. In particular, two recent works by noted legal historians illuminate death
sentencing at and before the American constitutional period. Professor Langbein's work
documents the critical role of juries and adversarial trial rights in the death-sentencing
process in both England and America. See John H. Langbein, The Origins of Adversary
Criminal Trial 334-38 (2003) [hereinafter Langbein, Origins]. Professor Banner's work
chronicles the development of death-penalty practice and procedure in America from
colonial times to the present. See Stuart Banner, The Death Penalty: An American History
(2002).
31. See infra text accompanying notes 249-253.
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tion spread as popular resistance to the death penalty and the corresponding rise of a prison system gave judges new options and new powers
in fixing sentences. Bifurcation came to capital cases quite late in our
history, primarily in response to the Court's Eighth Amendment decisions in the mid-1970s. My point in reviewing this history is not that bifurcation is a bad idea, nor that we must try capital cases today as we did in
1791. My point is simply that the separation of trial from capital sentencing is a post-constitutional idea that was born from a movement away
from capital punishment, not as a means to implement it. We cannot
assume, as the Court seems to have done,3 2 that separation of trial and
sentencing is part of the natural order of things, or that the "trial rights"
of the Sixth Amendment were conceived with such a separation in mind.
That world of unitary trials functioned against a backdrop of substantive criminal law featuring mandatory death penalties for numerous offenses.3 3 Judges had little or no discretion in capital sentencing.3 4 Instead, juries exercised de facto sentencing discretion in capital cases
through their power to issue a general verdict either acquitting the defendant or finding him guilty of a lesser, noncapital offense. Indeed, as one
leading historian tells us, the rights which today define our adversarial
trial system evolved in large measure as a counterweight to a system of
substantive criminal law that featured "too much death. '35 There was no
distinction between trial rights and sentencing rights because, in both
purpose and effect, the trial was the sentencing.
The modern Court's reluctance to extend full Sixth Amendment
protection to capital sentencing stems, in part, from a misreading of that
history. It may also stem from the practical concern that rights extended
to capital sentencing logically must extend to all sentencing. 3 6 After all,
the Sixth Amendment text speaks of "all criminal prosecutions, '3 7 not
just "all capital prosecutions." Any doctrine that turned every sentencing
into a full-blown jury trial would be impractical in a system with ten times
38
more sentencings than trials.
32. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 245-46 (1949); see also infra text
accompanying notes 57-59.
33. See infra notes 249-252 and accompanying text.
34. "The substantive criminal law tended to be sanction-specific .
Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 479 (2000) (quoting John H. Langbein, The English Criminal
Trial Jury on the Eve of the French Revolution, in The Trial Jury in England, France,
Germany 1700-1900, at 13, 36-37 (Antonio Padoa Schioppa ed., 1987) [hereinafter
Langbein, English Criminal Trial Jury]).
35. Langbein, Origins, supra note 30, at 334.
36. See, e.g., Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984) ("[A] capital sentencing
proceeding involves the same fundamental issue involved in any other sentencing
proceeding .... ").
37. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
38. More than ninety percent of criminal cases are resolved by guilty plea, resulting in
a system where sentencings are ubiquitous but trials are comparatively rare. See United
States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 781 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (noting that
guilty pleas resolve ninety-seven percent of federal prosecutions); see also U.S. Dep't of
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History, I suggest, answers that concern as well by providing a principled basis to distinguish capital from noncapital sentencing under the
Sixth Amendment. 39 In eighteenth-century England and colonial
America, many capital trials were essentially sentencing hearings, where
the issue of guilt went largely uncontested and the real question was
whether the defendant should die for his crime. 40 By the time of the
American Constitution, those proceedings had evolved into full adversarial trials, proceedings which formed a model for the rights enumerated in the Sixth Amendment. There is no comparable history of adversarial trials conducted primarily for the purpose of choosing among
noncapital sentencing options. 4 1 To the contrary, before the founding,
judges in cases of misdemeanor convictions had exercised sentencing discretion outside of the adversarial trial process. 42 And the first criminal
legislation passed by the First Congress made a comparable distinction.
That legislation prescribed death as the mandatory punishment for a
number of offenses. 43 It prescribed sentencing ranges for a handful of
noncapital offenses. 44 But there were no crimes for which a sentencing
judge could make a choice between life and death. In allowing that practice today in the absence of full Sixth Amendment protections, the Court
sanctions a practice that the Framers never saw and would not have
tolerated.
This Article is divided into three parts. Part I critiques the Court's
efforts to distinguish "trial rights" from "sentencing rights" in capital
cases. That effort began in 1949 with Williams v. New York, 45 a muchcriticized ruling that survives despite its roots in now-discredited history
and despite its reliance on a rehabilitative theory of punishment that logically has no place in the death-penalty discussion. The result of the
Court's post-Williams efforts, I suggest, is a fragmented doctrine which
recognizes some adversarial rights at capital sentencing, rejects others,
and seldom bothers to explain the difference.
Part II turns to Ring, Blakely, and Booker, tracing the Court's efforts to
fix the Sixth Amendment border between trial and sentencing. Whatever
the merits of that Sixth Amendment line drawing in noncapital cases, its
application to capital cases invites cat-and-mouse games that distort the
adversary system at sentencing. A defendant's right to cross-examine a
Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 448 (1996) (noting that 48,196 out of
52,270 (or about ninety-two percent) of defendants convicted in federal cases were
convicted pursuant to guilty pleas).
39. See infra Part III.B.3.
40. See Langbein, Origins, supra note 30, at 59.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 280-283.
42. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 480 n.7 (2000).
43. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, §§ 1, 3, 8-10, 14, 23, 1 Stat. 112, 112-17; see also infra
note 286 and accompanying text.
44. §§ 5-7, 11-13, 16, 17, 21-23, 26, 28, 1 Stat. at 113-18; see also infra note 287 and
accompanying text.
45. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
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crucial witness should not turn upon a legislature's designation of eligibility factors and selection factors, an often artificial distinction that bears
little relationship to the real issues affecting the choice between life and
death. A defendant's right to have a jury decide his fate should not turn
on the tactical choices of the prosecutor. Yet that is where Ring, Blakely,
and Booker have left us.
In Part III, I argue for a unified theory of Sixth Amendment rights
for capital trial and sentencing. To begin, I argue that the constitutional
text is more consistent with a unified theory than with the Court's fragmented approach. The text suggests a series of interdependent adversarial rights that apply throughout a "criminal prosecution." I then turn
from text to history. The Framers knew a world of unitary capital trials
where mandatory death penalties often turned trials into de facto sentencing proceedings, with juries acting as the final arbiter of life and
death. In the Sixth Amendment, I argue, the Framers created a single set
of adversarial rights with that unified system in mind. Finally, Part III
turns from the Framers' age to the modern, post-Furman age of capital
litigation. I argue that the Sixth Amendment rights of notice, counsel,
confrontation, compulsory process, and the right to ajury do not conflict
with Eighth Amendment concerns about consistency, proportionality,
and the sentencer's need for broad access to information. Instead, Sixth
Amendment rights will complement Eighth Amendment values and
make modern capital sentencing fairer.
I. Two

SIXTH AMENDMENT WORLDS:

TRIAL RIGHTS VERSUS SENTENCING

RIGHTS IN CAPITAL CASES

Among the various "trial rights" set out in the Sixth Amendment,
only the right to a jury trial, the right of confrontation, and the right to
counsel have received significant attention from the Court in the realm
of capital sentencing. The Court embraces the right to counsel at sentencing, while it rejects the right to jury sentencing, as well as most aspects of the right of confrontation. The Court has tended to address
each right in isolation, without pausing to reflect on their common origins in the text and history of the Sixth Amendment. The result is a
sentencing world that differs markedly from the world of trial; but, when
we look at the Court's sentencing rights cases as a whole, the reasons for
the difference appear ill-defined and inconsistent.
A. The Right of Confrontation
The Sixth Amendment grants an accused the right "to be confronted
with the witnesses against him. '46 At the guilt phase of trial, the Confrontation Clause embraces the defendant's right to be present, 4 7 to see gov46. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
47. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1987).
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ernment witnesses face to face, 4 3 and to cross-examine those witnesses. 49
As an outgrowth of the right of cross-examination, the Court has held
that the Confrontation Clause also functions as a constitutional hearsay
rule, excluding at least some out-of-court statements that have not been
50
subject to cross-examination.
At sentencing, the defendant's confrontation rights are much more
limited. While the Court has never explicitly stated whether the Confrontation Clause applies at sentencings generally or at capital sentencings in
particular, the Court has held that due process at capital sentencing does
not require the trial-like procedure of open-court testimony by witnesses
subject to cross-examination. Its sweeping opinion in Williams v. New York
allows a sentencing court to consider virtually any out-of-court source in
arriving at a death sentence, even though the defendant may have no
opportunity to question that source. 5 ' Because Williams lays the constitutional foundation for current practice-which largely ignores the law of
confrontation when it comes to sentencing-our examination of confrontation rights at capital sentencing begins there.
A New York jury found Samuel Williams guilty of murder and recommended life imprisonment. At sentencing, the judge relied on information from unspecified sources in the presentence investigation to conclude that Williams had committed thirty burglaries for which he had
never been convicted and that he possessed "a morbid sexuality. '52 Call53
ing Williams "a menace to society," the judge sentenced him to death.
In the Supreme Court, Williams argued that the sentencing court's reliance on out-of-court information deprived him of due process in viola54
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court rejected this argument: "[W]e do not think the Federal
Constitution restricts the view of the sentencing judge to the information
48. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845-48 (1990) (noting that face-to-face
confrontation is guaranteed absent compelling circumstances).
49. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17 (1974).
50. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1364-65 (2004). For an extensive
commentary on the application of the Confrontation Clause in the years leading up to
Crawford, see generally John G. Douglass, Confronting the Reluctant Accomplice, 101
Colum. L. Rev. 1797 (2001).
51. 337 U.S. 241, 251-52 (1949).
52. Id. at 244.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 243. In a technical sense, Williams was not making a Sixth Amendment
claim. In 1949, when Williams was decided, the Court had yet to apply the Confrontation
Clause to state prosecutions through the process of Fourteenth Amendment
incorporation. Accordingly, although it adjudicated confrontation-like rights, the Williams
Court never considered-or even mentioned-the Sixth Amendment text or its history.
Still, incorporation of the confrontation right was not really the problem in Williams. The
Court acknowledged as much when it said that the right to notice and the right to crossexamination-"salutary and time-tested protections"-were components of due process
that applied to the guilt phase of a state prosecution. Id. at 245. The basic question, then,
was whether these protections applied to capital sentencing.
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received in open court. The due process clause should not be treated as
a device for freezing the evidential procedure of sentencing in the mold
of trial procedure. 15 5 In other words, the essential elements of the confrontation right-testimony in open court by witnesses subject to crossexamination-simply did not extend to the world of sentencing.
For more than fifty years, Williams has stood as the principal barrier
to confrontation rights in capital sentencing. 56 Yet much of Williams's
rationale was questionable from the beginning, and more of its foundation has been eroded by time. To begin with, the Williams Court's view of
history is seriously flawed. According to Williams,
[B]oth before and since the American colonies became a nation, courts in this country and in England practiced a policy
under which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide discretion
in the sources and types of evidence used to assist him in-deterextent of punishment to be imposed within
mining the kind and
57
limits fixed by law.

But to support that claim, the Court relied on a series of annotations
from law digests, none of which contains a capital case from any American jurisdiction prior to-or even near-the founding. 58 The more historically accurate view is that English and early American criminal law was
dominated by mandatory penalties, not by discretion in sentencing. 59 In
55. Id. at 251.
56. See, e.g., Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 398 (7th Cir. 2002) ("[T]he Supreme Court
...has never questioned the precise holding of Williams.... .").
57. Williams, 337 U.S. at 246. According to Williams, New York's practice of relying on
presentence investigations by probation officers was merely a modern manifestation of an
"age-old practice of seeking [sentencing] information from out-of-court sources." Id. at
250-51.
58. Id. at 246 n.5. In fact, the vast majority of the noted cases are noncapital cases
from the nineteenth century, a period during which the historical practice of mandatory
sentences was giving way to discretionary sentencing. See infra text accompanying notes
292-296. Williams also cites a law review note which, upon examination, flatly contradicts
the Court's assertion that broad sentencing discretion was a fixture during and before the
American constitutional period. See Note, The Admissibility of Character Evidence in
Determining Sentence, 9 U. Chi. L. Rev. 715, 717 (1942) [hereinafter Note, Admissibility)
(noting that "[b]y statute in manyjurisdictions the power of sentencing was taken from the
court and vested in the jury" in the early nineteenth century), cited in Williams, 337 U.S. at
246 n.5. The Note accurately confirms that discretionary sentencing developed during the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries and that in earlier times "practically all felonies called
for the death sentence." Note, Admissibility, supra, at 715-16 & n.1.
59. See Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466, 479 (2000) ("[T]he English ...judge of
the later eighteenth century had very little explicit discretion in sentencing." (quoting
Langbein, English Criminal Trial Jury, supra note 34, at 36-37); McGautha v. California,
402 U.S. 183, 228 n.7 (1971) (DouglasJ., dissenting) ("[T]he common lawjudge generally
had no discretion as to the quantum of punishment in felony cases ...." (quoting Note,
Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 821, 832-33
(1968) [hereinafter Note, Procedural Due Process])); The Death Penalty in America 9
(Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 3d ed. 1982) ("Traditionally, under English law, death penalties
were mandatory; once the defendant was found guilty of a capital offense, the court had no
alternative but a death sentence."); Note, Admissibility, supra note 58, at 715 & n.1
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that world, there was little need for a court to seek out-of-court sources in
order to tailor its sentence because the court had little power to determine the sentence in the first place.
Aside from its misplaced reliance on history, Williams also claims
"sound practical reasons" for eliminating confrontation rights at sentencing.60 According to Williams, probation officers and sentencing courts
need unlimited access to out-of-court sources of information in order to
tailor an appropriately individualized sentence. That process, in turn,
promotes rehabilitation of offenders and allows them to be "restored
sooner to complete freedom and useful citizenship." 6 1 Toward that end,
Williams points out, probation officers are trained "not... to prosecute
but to aid offenders. '62 Whether this idealized notion of sentencer-asfriend reflected reality in 1949 seems doubtful. But regardless of the accuracy of its premise, the Court's chain of reasoning fails for a more obvious reason: It simply does not apply to a capital case. 63 In capital sentencing, individualization means choosing who, among the class of
convicted murderers, deserves to die. The government does not offer
individualized information at sentencing with the goal of making the defendant a better person in the long run. The government seeks to execute him. It is hard to imagine a more adversarial moment in the criminal process. Whether in the name of rehabilitation or of
individualization, it is hard to see why the Founders would choose that
moment to strip a defendant of the principal tools of the adversarial process: the right to see, hear, and cross-examine the sources of information
that might lead to his death.
The final pillar of Williams's reasoning has collapsed in the face of
64
the Eighth Amendment revolution spawned by Furman v. Georgia. Williams was decided when unguided sentencing discretion was the constitutionally blessed norm in capital cases-when, as Williams put it, a sentencer might issue a death sentence "giving no reason at all." 65 But
(explaining that discretionary sentencing did not develop until the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries); see also Langbein, Origins, supra note 30, at 334-35 (describing
practice of English juries to convict for lesser, noncapital offenses to avoid mandatory
death penalties); Banner, supra note 30, at 89-90 (describing similar practice in American
colonies).

60. 337 U.S. at 246.
61. Id. at 249.

62. Id.
63. As the Court acknowledged years later in rejecting the same argument that
Williams had embraced, the "extinction of all possibility of rehabilitation is one of the
aspects of the death sentence that makes it different in kind from any other sentence."
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 360 (1977); see also Beale, supra note 20, at 157-58
("The rhetoric of the rehabilitative ideal also led courts to characterize the [sentencing]
proceedings as non-adversarial. While the reality did not live up to this vision, the vision
nonetheless played an important role in shaping the Williams ruling." (citation omitted)).
64. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
65. Williams, 337 U.S. at 252. The Court continued to approve of absolute discretion
in capital sentencing for decades after Williams, though that discretion was typically
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Furman concluded that unguided discretion violates the Eighth Amendment.6 6 If capital sentencing discretion is subject to constitutional limits,
then it follows that there must be at least some adversarial process to
enforce those limits. The Court itself recognized as much when it decided Gardner v. Florida only a few years after Furman.67 Unfortunately,
that recognition alone was not enough to give Williams the burial it
deserved.
In the intervening years between Williams and the time Gardnercame
before the Court, the world of capital punishment changed dramatically.
Furman not only had washed away the notion of unlimited discretion in
capital sentencing, but it had given rise to the idea that "death is different" and should be accompanied by heightened protections to insure reliable sentencing decisions based on reason rather than whim. 68 These
changes could have formed the basis for rejecting Williams and causing a
major shift that would have brought Sixth Amendment protections to the
new, post-Furman world of capital sentencing. 69 But that never happened. At least six members of the Court rejected the notion that a
death sentence might be imposed based on secret information from
sources never identified, much less cross-examined. 70 Yet none chose to
entrusted to juries, not judges. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 207 (1971)
("[W]e find it quite impossible to say that committing to the untrammeled discretion of
the jury the power to pronounce life or death in capital cases is offensive to anything in the
Constitution.").
66. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 274 (Brennan, J., concurring) (explaining that arbitrary
punishments are prohibited by Eighth Amendment); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (concluding that random imposition of death penalty is unconstitutional).
67. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 360 (plurality opinion) ("Florida argues that trial judges can
be trusted to exercise their discretion in a responsible manner, even though they may base
their decisions on secret information. However acceptable that argument might have been
before Furman v. Georgia, it is now clearly foreclosed.").
Gardnerpresented the Court with facts almost identical to those in Williams. Gardner
had been found guilty of murder by ajury that recommended a life sentence. After taking
into account additional information developed out of court in a presentence investigation,
the trial court sentenced Gardner to death. The principal distinguishing feature in
Gardner was that a small "confidential" portion of the presentence report was never
disclosed to the defense. Id. at 355-56 (plurality opinion).
68. See Steiker & Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts, supra note 8, at 370-71 (noting
that "death as punishment differs in kind, and not merely degree, from all other
punishments").
69. Given changes in constitutional criminal procedure, and in death-penalty
procedure under Furman, it would have taken no large leap to apply Sixth Amendment
"trial rights" to capital sentencing in the process of deciding Gardner. The Court had
already applied the Confrontation Clause to state prosecutions. See Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400, 403 (1965). It readily applied one Sixth Amendment protection-the right to
counsel-even to noncapital sentencing. See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967).
And the new requirements of Furman gave the Court a principled basis by which to
distinguish capital from noncapital sentencing, thus avoiding the serious practical
difficulty of turning all sentencings into trials.
70. Gardner,430 U.S. at 359-61 (plurality opinion); id. at 364 (White,J., concurring);
id. (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 365 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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rest an opinion on the portion of the Constitution most clearly designed
to prevent that kind of evil. In the six opinions written in Gardner, the
words "Sixth Amendment" and "confrontation" never appear.
Instead, without mentioning the Sixth Amendment, Justice Stevens's
plurality opinion accepted the premise of Williams: that capital sentencing was something less than a "normal adversary proceeding." 7 1 Still, the
plurality acknowledged, due process required some measure of procedural protection to insure that courts complied with the substantive limits
Furman had placed on sentencing discretion. 72 Unfortunately, the Gardner plurality made little effort to define what level of procedural protection was constitutionally adequate. In a narrow ruling, the plurality simply concluded that Florida failed to provide due process when it imposed
a death sentence "on the basis of information which [the defendant] had
no opportunity to deny or explain." 73 Ever cautious, the opinion added,
"The fact that due process applies [at sentencing] does not, of course,
'74
implicate the entire panoply of criminal trial procedural rights.
The Court has never said that the right to "deny or explain" sentencing information includes the confrontation rights that Williams rejected:
the right to see, hear, and cross-examine the sources of that information.
Nor has the Court ever employed Gardner-orthe Confrontation Clause
for that matter-to exclude hearsay offered by prosecutors at sentencing.
Instead, in a string of noncapital cases reaching well into the 1990s, the
Court has continued to cite Williams favorably for the broad proposition
that there are no constitutional limits on the sources of information that
75
a court may consider in the process of sentencing.
Today, federal appellate courts continue to cite Williams for the pro76
position that the Confrontation Clause does not apply at sentencing,
whether capital or otherwise. 77 At sentencing, prosecutors remain free to
rely on hearsay that would be barred at trial by the Confrontation Clause.
Thus, in capital sentencings, courts have allowed summary testimony
from police 78 and from expert witnesses, 79 noting that such testimony
satisfies the Constitution so long as the defendant is given an opportunity
to rebut it.
71. Id. at 356 (plurality opinion).
72. Id. at 360-61.
73. Id. at 362.
74. Id. at 358 n.9.
75. See, e.g., United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 151-52 (1997); Roberts v. United
States, 445 U.S. 552, 556 (1980); United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 49 (1978); United
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446-47 (1972).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 397-98 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc);
United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1100 (3d Cir. 1990).
77. See, e.g., Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 398 (7th Cir. 2002); Bassette v. Thompson,
915 F.2d 932, 939 (4th Cir. 1990).
78. Chandler v. Moore, 240 F.3d 907, 918 (11th Cir. 2001).
79. Del Vecchio v. I11.
Dep't of Corr., 31 F.3d 1363, 1387-88 (7th Cir. 1994).
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Williams's profound impact on evidence at sentencing has been codified in federal law and in the evidentiary rules of many states. In 1970,
Congress passed a statute providing, "No limitation shall be placed on the
information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a
person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may
receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence."8 0 The House Report on that provision cited Williams.8 1 Two
years later, the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence included Rule
1101 (d) (3), still in effect today, which provides that the rules of evidence
do not apply at sentencing. In support of that provision, the Advisory
Committee Note cites Williams for the proposition that "due process does
not require confrontation or cross-examination in sentencing . . . and
that the judge has broad discretion as to the sources and types of infor'8 2
mation relied upon.
The Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA) of 1994 likewise codifies Williams for federal capital cases. The FDPA provides that, at the sentencing
phase, "[i]nformation is admissible regardless of its admissibility under
the rules governing admission of evidence at criminal trials. '8 3 With a
nod to Gardnerand due process principles of "reliability," the FDPA adds,
"information may be excluded [at sentencing] if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
or misleading the jury ....
The government and the defendant shall be
permitted to rebut any information received at the hearing. '8 4 Most
death-penalty states follow the federal practice, conducting capital sentencing hearings that are not subject to the same state rules of evidence
8 5
that apply at the guilt phase.
Williams did not deal directly with the procedural side of the confrontation right; that is, it did not tell us explicitly what the Constitution
requires when the government actually calls a witness for live testimony at
capital sentencing. At trial, the Confrontation Clause guarantees the
80. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 951 (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2000)).
81. H.R. Rep. No. 91-1549, at 63 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4040;
see also United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50 n.10 (1978) (recounting Congress's
reliance on Williams in enacting statute).
82. Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(3) advisory committee's note. Years later, the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines followed suit, providing that, "In determining the sentence ... the
court may consider, without limitation, any information concerning the background,
character and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by law." U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.4 (2004). The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
further provide that, "In resolving any dispute concerning a factor important to the
sentencing determination, the court may consider relevant information without regard to
its admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable at trial, provided that the
information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy." Id.
§ 6A1.3(a).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c).
84. Id.
85. See Kelly, supra note 7, at 457.
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right to physically confront such a witness-i.e., the right of the defendant to see and hear the witness testify in person. Likewise it would guarantee a "full and fair opportunity" to cross-examine that witness 8 6 and
would prohibit the court from restricting cross-examination reasonably
calculated to test the accuracy and credibility of that witness. 87 On its
face, Williams appears to negate these procedural rights as well. After all,
if it is constitutionally permissible for a judge to assemble sentencing information from sources out of court, whom the defendant never sees,
hears, or cross-examines, it seems hard to complain when the source at
least shows up to testify, even if the court decides to limit cross-examination or dispense with it altogether. And, under Williams, if the prosecution fears cross-examination of its witness, it could simply submit his story
in the form of an affidavit.
Still, it seems more than peculiar-indeed, all of our instincts about
courtroom procedure tell us it would be inherently unfair-for a witness
to answer the prosecutor's questions and then walk away before the defense counsel had an opportunity to probe. To me, the obvious unfairness of that scenario is reason enough to rethink Williams. Certainly it is
reason enough not to read Williams broadly, as many courts have done, to
mean simply that the Confrontation Clause does not apply at sentencing.
Indeed, as a matter of universal practice, where witnesses testify in sentencing proceedings, courts allow cross-examination by the defense and, I
suggest, would never imagine doing otherwise. The Court's own words
confirm that basic instinct. In Barefoot v. Estelle, for example, the Court
approved the prosecution's use of psychiatric testimony regarding the defendant's future dangerousness partly on the grounds that the defendant
would have "the benefit of cross-examination" in countering that testimony.88 Similarly, in Caldwell v. Mississippi,while holding that the Eighth
Amendment right to consideration of individualized mitigating factors
cannot be satisfied merely by appellate review of such factors, the Court
said, "When we held that a defendant has a constitutional fight to the
consideration of such factors, we clearly envisioned that that consideration would occur among sentencers who were present to hear the evidence ... and see the witnesses." 8 9 Without addressing Williams directly,
both passages suggest an understanding that both physical confrontation
and cross-examination of witnesses should be the procedural norm at
capital sentencing. Whether, if asked, the Court would make it the constitutional norm, and how it might choose to distinguish Williams in the
process, are questions yet to be answered.

86. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 22 (1985) (per curiam).
87. See, e.g., Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231 (1988) (per curiam) (finding
violation of Confrontation Clause where defendant was prohibited from cross-examining
regarding bias); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-17 (1974) (same).

88. 463 U.S. 880, 898 (1983).
89. 472 U.S. 320, 330-31 (1985) (citations omitted).
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For the moment at least, Williams has placed capital sentencing
outside the world of "trial" procedure. The result has been a sentencing
world with virtually no constitutional limits on hearsay, and with no constitutional assurance that a defendant facing death will be equipped with
the basic tools of the adversarial process. And despite its recognition that
adversarial rights are "often essential to the truth-seeking function of trials,"9 0 Gardner did very little to import those rights into the world of sentencing. Ironically, when it comes to confrontation, we now have a sentencing world that accords a convicted criminal defendant facing death
no more procedural rights than we accord a civil defendant contesting
monetary damages. 91 The same, we are about to see, is true when it
comes to the role of the jury.
B. The Right to Jury Sentencing
Two passages in the Constitution recognize the right to trial by jury.
Article III, Section 2, provides: "The trial of all crimes, except in cases of
impeachment, shall be by jury .... -"92 The Sixth Amendment repeats
that guarantee, and explicitly adds the requirement of impartiality: "In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury ....
-03 Neither passage tells us
whether a "trial" encompasses sentencing.
The near-universal reliance on jury sentencing in capital cases, 9 4 and
the Court's early reluctance to apply the jury right in state prosecutions,9 5
may account for the fact that, before the Warren years, the Supreme
Court never faced the question whether a defendant had a constitutional
right to ajury determination of life or death. In 1968, only months after
Duncan v. Louisiana held that the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,9 6 the Court
had its first opportunity to explore that question. Whether it decided the
issue, however, is open to debate.
In Witherspoon v. Illinois, the defendant was found guilty and sentenced to death by ajury after the trial court struck for cause all potential
jurors who said they opposed the death penalty or had conscientious
scruples against it.9 7 Witherspoon contended that he had been deprived
of his right to an "impartial" jury at both the guilt and sentencing
90. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 360 (1977).
91. See Beale, supra note 20, at 157.
92. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
93. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
94. By 1948, only three states allowed judges to impose a death sentence that was not
recommended by a jury. See Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 758 (1948)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
95. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 322-25 (1937) (noting that right to jury
trial is not component of Fourteenth Amendment due process protection in state
prosecutions).
96. 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
97. 391 U.S. 510, 513 (1968).
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phases. 98 After rejecting his claim with respect to the guilt phase, the
Court addressed sentencing, explicitly invoking the Sixth Amendment in
the process: "[I]n its role as arbiter of the punishment to be imposed,
this jury fell woefully short of that impartiality to which petitioner was
entitled under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments." 9 9 That sentence
is as close as the Court has ever come to holding that the Sixth Amendment encompasses a right to jury sentencing in capital cases. The Court
quite clearly states that Witherspoon's entitlement to an impartial jury at
sentencing stems from the Sixth Amendment. And, one might argue, the
Sixth Amendment could not extend the right to an impartialjury to the
sentencing process were there no right to a jury in the first place. 0 0 On
the other hand, despite Witherspoon's broad language, it may be equally
valid to read the opinion more narrowly, as holding merely that ifa jury
participates in capital sentencing, due process requires that it be impartial. 10 1 Whatever the Warren Court may have intended in Witherspoon,
the ruling seems to have had no influence on later decisions regarding
the jury right at capital sentencing. When the issue next appeared before
the Court, Witherspoon was simply ignored.
In the wake of Furman v. Georgia, eight states changed their deathpenalty statutes to allow judges to make the ultimate life-or-death decision. 10 2 After twice declining to address the constitutionality of statutes
authorizing judge-ordered death,10 3 the Court finally confronted the issue in Spaziano v. Florida.10 4 Spaziano was tried before a jury and convicted of first-degree murder. After a sentencing hearing, the same jury
recommended life imprisonment. Under Florida's statute, the trial judge
had the power to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors independently
and thereby arrive at his or her own sentencing decision. 10 5 Following
that "override" procedure, the judge sentenced Spaziano to death. 10 6 In
the Supreme Court, Spaziano argued that Florida violated both his Sixth
and Eighth Amendment rights when a judge sentenced him to death
without the concurrence of a jury. Thus, the "fundamental" question, as
98. Id. at 516-18.
99. Id. at 518.
100. In dissent, Justice White implicitly acknowledges that argument by attacking it.
Noting that mandatory death penalties do not violate the Constitution, White argues,
"Why, then, should [the legislature] be disabled from delegating the penalty decision to a
group who will impose the death penalty more often than would a group differently
chosen?" Id. at 541 (White, J., dissenting).
101. This narrower reading is consistent with the Court's statement that "nothing in
our decision turns upon whether the judge is bound to follow [the jury's]
recommendation." Id. at 518 n.12.
102. See Stephen Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 18 n.79 (1980).
103. See Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637, 642 n.* (1978); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 609
n.16 (1978).
104. 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
105. Id. at 451-52.
106. Id. at 458.
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the Court framed it, was whether "the capital sentencing decision is one
'
that, in all cases, should be made by a jury. 107
The Court rejected Spaziano's claims under both the Sixth and
Eighth Amendments. The Court's Sixth Amendment ruling is remarkable for its brevity and, I suggest, for its shallow analysis. The portion of
the opinion dealing with the Sixth Amendment occupies only two
paragraphs. °s It makes no mention of the constitutional text. It says
nothing of the history, origin, and purpose of the Sixth Amendment right
to ajury. It makes no attempt to explain, distinguish, or limit Witherspoon.
Instead, the Court simply concludes, "[A] capital sentencing proceeding
involves the same fundamental issue involved in any other sentencing
proceeding-a determination of the appropriate punishment to be imposed on an individual."1 0 9 The Court adds without elaboration, "The
Sixth Amendment never has been thought to guarantee a right to ajury
determination of that issue." 110 In other words, the sum of Spaziano's
Sixth Amendment analysis is merely that (a) the principal issue in capital
sentencing is essentially the same as ordinary sentencing, and (b) there
has never been a right to ajury for ordinary sentencing.
Both conclusions are flawed. First, to suggest that capital sentencing
"involves the same fundamental issue" as ordinary sentencing is to ignore
Furman and the countless post-Furman cases whose main purpose is to
demonstrate how capital sentencing is fundamentally different from ordinary sentencing. To begin with, of course, there is the oft-quoted observation that "death is different" in its uncorrectable finality and that, therefore, capital sentencing calls for heightened procedural safeguards."'
Further, the principal constitutional difference, after Woodson, is that sen12
tencing is itself a constitutionally required procedure in capital cases,'
whereas legislatively imposed mandatory penalties are permissible if
death is not at issue.1 13 It is a great deal easier to dismiss the idea of Sixth
Amendment rights at sentencing when there is no right to any sentencing
at all. 11 4 After Furman and Woodson, of course, that is never the case
when death is at issue.
Second, by concluding in a single, unsupported sentence that "t] he
Sixth Amendment has never been thought" to guarantee jury sentencing,
the Spaziano Court repeated the erroneous historical assumption at the
heart of Williams. Williams had regarded judicial discretion in sentencing
as an "age-old" norm when, in fact, it was merely the predominant nine107. Id.
108. Id. at 458-59.
109. Id. at 459.
110. Id.
111. See supra note 68.
112. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
113. See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 567-68 (2002).
114. Cf. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609-11 (1974) (declining to extend right to
appointed counsel to discretionary review in state supreme court and noting that "[s] tate
need not provide any appeal at all").
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teenth-century practice in noncapital cases.' 15 To assume that the Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial "has never been thought" to encompass
sentencing is to ignore the world of the founders, where a unitary proceeding adjudicated guilt and punishment with a single jury verdict.
And, contrary to Spaziano's conclusion, the question of "appropriate punishment" was not only at issue in those unified proceedings, but was often
6
the principal issue faced by the jury.'
Though they were decided during different epochs in the history of
our constitutional criminal procedure, and though they address different
trial rights in the context of capital sentencing, Spaziano and Williams are
cut from the same cloth. Both decisions assume as a starting point that
judicial discretion is part of the natural order of the sentencing world, a
historical perspective that is both unsupported and unsupportable. Both
decisions treat capital sentencing as if it were fundamentally the same as
ordinary sentencing, a view that conflicts with dozens of the Court's
Eighth Amendment decisions. Both seem consumed with matters of sentencing policy, while largely ignoring the adversarial values at the heart of
the Sixth Amendment. And the two decisions reach the same conclusion:
A defendant faces capital sentencing without the rights that protect him
at trial.
Since 1984, the Court has been unwilling to revisit Spaziano's basic
holding that the Sixth Amendment does not mandate jury sentencing in
capital cases. If anything, the Court has implicitly affirmed that holding
in other contexts." 17
C. The Right to Counsel
At trial, the Sixth Amendment guarantees not only the right to counsel, but the right of an indigent defendant to the appointment of coun115.

Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250 (1949).

116. See infra text accompanying note 265. In contrast to its truncated treatment of
the Sixth Amendment, the Court considered Spaziano's Eighth Amendment claims at
length before ultimately rejecting them. Perhaps it is understandable that Eighth
Amendment issues dominated the Court's attention in Spaziano. After all, in the decades
following Furman, the Eighth Amendment had become the constitutional touchstone for
virtually all death-penalty litigation. Still, in my view, Spaziano stems from a kind of
constitutional myopia. It is at least curious that the Court proved so willing to dissect the
role of juries in relation to the perceived purposes of the Eighth Amendment-giving
voice to "community outrage" and insuring compliance with "contemporary standards of
decency"-while largely ignoring the jury's critical function in the adversarial system
spelled out in the Sixth Amendment. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 461, 464
(1984).
117. See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (holding that sentencing
factors that may lead to imposition of death must be found by jury, but failing to embrace
capital sentencing by juries); Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 515 (1995) (holding
Alabama's procedure allowing judicial override of jury recommendation against death
does not violate Eighth Amendment).

20051

CONFRONTING DEATH

1987

sel' 18 and the right to effective assistance of counsel1 19 The basic right
of an accused to the assistance of counsel "[iln all criminal prosecutions"
appears in the same Sixth Amendment sentence that guarantees the
rights of confrontation and of trial byjury. t 20 Yet, in contrast to its treatment of those other Sixth Amendment rights at sentencing, the Court
has never balked at extending the right to counsel to sentencing hearings-capital or noncapital-in the same manner the right applies at
trial.
Even before Gideon v. Wainwright, the Court found that the absence
of appointed counsel during sentencing could render the proceeding unfair under the Due Process Clause.12 1 And shortly after Gideon had incorporated the Sixth Amendment right to appointment of counsel into state
proceedings, the Court in Mempa v. Rhay extended that right to sentencing. 12 2 The Mempa Court held that the right to counsel applies at "every
stage of a criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected."'1 23 The unanimous Court had no trouble concluding that sentencing was such a "critical" stage where appointment of
124
counsel was necessary to protect substantial rights.
Two decades after Mempa, the Court, in Stickland v. Washington, not
only extended the right to effective assistance of counsel to the capital
sentencing process, but also held that the constitutional standard for effective assistance is the same at capital sentencing as at trial. 12 5 Though
Strickland and Spaziano were decided only months apart, their perspectives on capital sentencing are at opposite poles. In Strickland, the Court
took pains to link the world of capital sentencing with the world of trial:
A capital sentencing proceeding ... is sufficiently like a trial in
its adversarial format and in the existence of standards for decision, that counsel's role in the proceeding is comparable to
counsel's role at trial-to ensure that the adversarial testing process works to produce a just result under the standards gov126
erning decision.
In Spaziano, the Court noted that capital sentencing "involves the
same fundamental issue" as ordinary sentencing.12 7 Neither opinion
mentioned the other. And neither sought to explain why capital sentenc118. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-45 (1963).
119. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87 (1984).
120. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
121. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948).
122. 389 U.S. 128, 134-35 (1967).
123. Id. at 134.
124. Id.
125. 466 U.S. 668, 686-87 (1984).
126. Id. The Court has extended the right to effective assistance of counsel to
ordinary sentencing as well, including cases where counsel's ineffectiveness has relatively
minimal impact. See, e.g., Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198 (2001).
127. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1983).
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ing is like ordinary sentencing for purposes of the jury right, but like a
128
trial for purposes of the right to counsel.
D. Other Sixth Amendment Rights at Capital Sentencing
This Article has focused on the right of confrontation, the right to
trial by jury, and the right to counsel because those are the trial rights
that have received significant attention from the Court in the context of
capital sentencing. However, it is worth noting the Court's treatmentor lack of treatment-of other Sixth Amendment rights, if only to
demonstrate further the gaps and inconsistencies that characterize the
Court's fragmentary approach to trial rights at capital sentencing.
1. Notice. - The Sixth Amendment grants an accused the right "to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation."' 12 9 Both Williams
and Gardner are, in part, notice cases, though both address the question
under the Due Process Clause rather than the Sixth Amendment. 3 0 In
Gardner, the defendant's principal complaint was that the trial court
failed to disclose portions of a presentence report. The Supreme Court's
narrow holding addresses little more than that complaint, finding that
due process forbids capital sentencing based on information never dis31
closed to defendant.
More recently, the Court has suggested, though it has not explicitly
held, that due process requires notice of facts that may elevate a noncapital sentence. In Burns v. United States, the Court held that a federal court
must give a defendant adequate notice before departing upward from the
United States Sentencing Guidelines (Federal Sentencing Guidelines).132
While the case was decided by interpreting the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the Burns Court concluded by noting that "were we to read
Rule 32 to dispense with notice, we would then have to confront the serious question whether notice in this setting is mandated by the Due Process Clause.' 33 Taken together, Gardner and Burns probably establish a
right to be apprised of information the sentencer will consider, as well as
128. In the context of trial, the Court has identified other aspects of the right to
counsel, including the right to counsel of choice and the right to self-representation. The
Court has never explicitly addressed these rights in the context of sentencing, capital or
noncapital. Perhaps because of Mempa's categorical language-"the right to counsel
applies at sentencing," 389 U.S. at 134-most lower courts have either assumed or held
that these other aspects of the right to counsel apply at sentencing as well as at trial.
Michaels, supra note 3, at 1794-97.
129. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
130. Williams acknowledged that the right to "reasonable notice of the charges" is
inherent in principles of due process that govern trial. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,
245 (1949) (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948)).
131. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977).
132. 501 U.S. 129, 138-39 (1991) (requiring "reasonable notice" to defendant before
upward departure on grounds not known to parties).
133. Id. at 138.
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a right to respond to that information in some fashion. Still, neither case
suggests that the Sixth Amendment is the source of that right.
2. Compulsory Process. - At trial, the Sixth Amendment provides that
an accused "shall enjoy the right ... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." 134 The right extends beyond the power to
issue a subpoena and encompasses the right to call witnesses and present
favorable evidence. Relying both on the Compulsory Process Clause and
principles of due process, the Court has held that state evidentiary rules
may not arbitrarily limit a defendant's right to present favorable testimony at trial.

1 35

In Green v. Georgia, the Court overturned a death sentence where a
state court had applied the hearsay rule to exclude key defense evidence
at the sentencing phase of a capital case.' 3 6 Significantly, Green draws no
distinction between trial and sentencing in addressing a defendant's right
to present favorable evidence. The opinion proceeds as if it were assumed that the right to present evidence applied equally at the sentencing phase. Curiously, the Court even uses the word "trial" in referring to
the sentencing process in its holding: "Because the exclusion of ... testimony denied petitioner a fair trial on the issue of punishment, the sentence is vacated .... -137 The lone dissenter, Justice Rehnquist, never
challenges the notion that a defendant's right to present evidence applies
at the sentencing phase. 138 Whether Green establishes a right to present
evidence at sentencing-just as the right exists at trial-or whether it
stands for something more limited, is hard to say. At least in noncapital
cases, most lower courts continue to insist that there is no general right
139
for a defendant to call witnesses or present evidence at sentencing.
134. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
135. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (holding that state cannot
apply hearsay rule "mechanistically" where right to present witnesses is implicated);
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967) (finding state evidentiary rules may not
"arbitrarily" deny defendant's compulsory process rights).
136. 442 U.S. 95 (1979). Green does not rely explicitly on the Sixth Amendment and
states only that the sentencing violated the Due Process Clause. Id. at 97. But Green relies
on Chambers, a case that constructed a right to present evidence out of both due process
and Sixth Amendment principles, and Green further relies on Professor Westen's popular
article that identifies Sixth Amendment sources for that right. See id. at 97 & n.4 (citing
Peter Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for
Criminal Cases, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 567, 592-93 (1978)).
137. Id. at 97.
138. Id. at 98-99 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that Court cannot supercede
state's evidentiary rules and determinations to serve its own notion of justice). The
absence of discussion on this pivotal issue is surprising. In its only other encounter with
the right to present evidence at capital sentencing, the Court expressly acknowledged that
it had never decided the question. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 218-19
(1971).
139. See Michaels, supra note 3, at 1846 (explaining that lower courts find due
process right to rebut state's evidence but no "general right to call witnesses at
sentencing").
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3. Speedy Trial. - The Supreme Court has never decided whether
the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a speedy trial includes the right to a
speedy sentencing.' 40 The matter is unlikely to arise at the time of initial
sentencing, as sentencings typically follow soon after trial. Still,
resentencings are not uncommon following successful appeals in capital
cases, and such sentencings often occur years after the original conviction. Under those circumstances, some lower federal courts have found,
and others have suggested, that Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights en14
compass sentencing. 1
4. Public Trial. - Both the First and the Sixth Amendments call for
public access to court proceedings when (1) the type of proceeding historically has been open to the public, and (2) public access would play a
"significant positive role" in the functioning of the proceeding. 14 2 The
14
Court has held that the right to open proceedings extends to voir dire, 3
1 44
to pretrial hearings on motions to suppress evidence,
and to preliminary hearings. 145 It has never decided whether the right to public trial
46
extends to sentencing.'
Nevertheless, it seems obvious that sentencings generally, and capital
sentencings in particular, are encompassed by the right to open proceedings. Based on historical practice, there is no reason to distinguish a public sentencing from a public trial, because sentencing was part of a unified trial where a single verdict determined both guilt and
punishment) 4 7 And public access at sentencing, no less than at the guilt
phase, serves the constitutional goals of ensuring fairness to the defendant and promoting public confidence in judicial proceedings. Indeed,
both the retributivist and deterrence theories of punishment at the heart
of our criminal justice system would be undermined if sentences were
148
imposed in secret.
140. Id. at 1828 (citing Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361-62 (1957), in which
the Court assumed, arguendo, existence of the right and then found no violation under
the facts of the case).
141. See id. at 1828-29 (reviewing federal and state court decisions regarding speedy
trial right at sentencing).
142. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-EnterpriseI1), 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986);
see also Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984) (highlighting public trial analysis under
First and Sixth Amendments and discussing purpose of public access).
143. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise1), 464 U.S. 501, 510-11
(1984).
144. Waler, 467 U.S. at 47-48.
145. Press-Enterprise11, 478 U.S. at 10.
146. Michaels, supra note 3, at 1832.
147. See infra text accompanying notes 249-253.
148. While the right almost certainly extends to courtroom sentencing proceedings, it
is less clear that it grants public access to sentencing-related documents, such as
presentence reports. Presentence reports typically have been treated as confidential, and
at least one federal appellate court has exempted such reports from public disclosure on
that basis. See United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224, 229 (7th Cir. 1989).
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E. A Fragmented Sixth Amendment at Capital Sentencing
As our tour through the world of capital sentencing demonstrates,
there is no single, comprehensive answer as to whether the Sixth Amendment governs capital sentencing. The Court has provided some unequivocal answers with respect to some rights. Spaziano tells us that "the Sixth
Amendment does not require jury sentencing. 1 49 Mempa states just as
categorically, but in the affirmative, that "the right to counsel applies at
sentencing."1 50 With respect to other Sixth Amendment rights, as we
have seen, the answer is more complex. The confrontation right, at least
as far as it means excluding hearsay, is currently not part of the capital
sentencing world in light of Williams.151 Whether other aspects of the
confrontation right survive Williams is more problematic. Some right to
notice exists under Gardner, and a right to present favorable evidence
may exist in some form under both Gardner and Green. 15 2 Still, each of
those opinions speaks explicitly of due process, leaving the Sixth Amendment on the sidelines. As for the guarantee of a speedy and public trial,
the Court has yet to speak in the context of sentencing. 153 In sum, other
than the right to counsel, we see only shadows of the Sixth Amendment
in the world of capital sentencing.
From the Court's flat rejection ofjury sentencing in Spaziano, its rejection of confrontation-like rights in Williams, and its failure even to
mention the Sixth Amendment in Gardner and Green, it is tempting to
conclude that the Court views sentencing generally, and even capital sentencing in particular, as governed only by principles of "fundamental fairness" under the Due Process Clause, and not by the specific "trial rights"
guaranteed in the Sixth Amendment. Indeed, the Court came close to
saying as much in Gardnerwhen it commented: "The fact that due process applies does not, of course, implicate the entire panoply of criminal
54
trial procedural rights.'
A "fundamental fairness" approach to capital sentencing rights, however, is inconsistent with the Court's right-to-counsel decisions. Both
Mempa and Strickland are explicitly Sixth Amendment opinions. Both
opinions share as a common starting point the notion that they are adjudicating a right to counsel enumerated in the Sixth Amendment and
made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth.1 55 Indeed, as recently as 2001, the Court has reaffirmed the right to effective assistance of
counsel at sentencing and has found "Sixth Amendment significance" in
149.
150.
Advocate
803, 806
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 464 (1984).
Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967) (citing Sanford H. Kadish, The
and the Expert-Counsel in the Peno-Correctional Process, 45 Minn. L. Rev.
(1961)).
See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part I.D.1-2.
See supra Part I.D.3-4.
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 n.9 (1977).
See supra Part I.C.
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any increase in jail time that results from counsel's errors. 156 Implicitly
then, the Court treats sentencing-even noncapital sentencing-as part
of a "criminal prosecution" under the Sixth Amendment for at least some
purposes.
It has been characteristic of the Court's fragmented approach to sentencing rights to address them one right at a time, without reference to
the others. For example, Mempa never mentions Williams, even though
Williams was at the time the Court's only significant ruling regarding procedural rights at capital sentencing. Spaziano and Strickland both were
pending before the Court at the same time and were decided only
months apart. Both, quite explicitly, consider whether a basic Sixth
Amendment guarantee applies at capital sentencing. Yet neither opinion
mentions the other.
The Court has reached opposing conclusions about various trial
rights at capital sentencing by comparing capital sentencings to trial for
some purposes, but to ordinary sentencings for other purposes, with little
explanation for its differing perspectives. In the eyes of the Strickland
Court, capital sentencing is just like trial in its "adversarial format" and its
"standards for decision," while it is unlike ordinary sentencing "which
may involve informal proceedings and standardless discretion in the sentencer." 15 7 Similarly, the Court in Green called the capital sentencing
phase a "trial on the issue of punishment."1 58 By contrast, Spaziano found
that "a capital sentencing proceeding involves the same fundamental issue involved in any other sentencing proceeding." 159 Likewise, Williams
was quick to dismiss the argument that a capital sentencing is different
from an ordinary sentencing and therefore merits the procedural protections of a trial. 160 To the Strickland and Green Courts, capital sentencing
is a trial. To the Williams and Spaziano Courts, it is an ordinary sentencing. The decisions are worlds apart in perspective, and the Court has
never tried to explain the difference.
Just as the Court's approach to the Sixth Amendment at capital sentencing is marked by unexplained inconsistency, its determination to
limit "trial rights" at capital sentencing is hard to reconcile with the rest
of its death-penalty doctrine. Put more bluntly, the Court's Sixth Amendment results have not matched its Eighth Amendment rhetoric. A pillar
of its Eighth Amendment doctrine is the notion that death is different
from any other form of punishment. "Because of that qualitative difference," the Court has said, "there is a corresponding difference in the
need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate
punishment in a specific case."1 6 1 In theory, the need for reliability in
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203 (2001).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979).
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984).
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 240, 251-52 (1949).
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
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the context of the death penalty translates into a heightened degree of
procedural protection, which, the Court suggests, should distinguish capital sentencings from the ordinary sentencing process. But, at least with
regard to the rights listed in the Sixth Amendment, the Court's rules for
capital sentencing are essentially the same as for noncapital sentencing.1 62 The Court's remark in Spaziano, that "a capital sentencing proceeding involves the same fundamental issue involved in any other sentencing proceeding," 163 has carried the day. When it comes to Sixth
Amendment rights at sentencing, it seems, death is not so different after
all.
II.

RING, BLAKELY,BOOKER, AND BEYOND: TROUBLE AT THE BORDER
BETWEEN Two SIXTH AMENDMENT WORLDS

The Court insists there is a difference between "trial rights" and "sentencing rights." Thus, it becomes necessary to answer a fundamental
question: When does "trial" end and "sentencing" begin? On its surface,
the answer seems self-evident. Trial is over when the defendant is found
guilty; sentencing follows. That, after all, was the simple line that Williams
drew between the process of "passing on the guilt of a defendant" 164 and
the very different process of "imposition of sentence upon an already
convicted defendant."1 65 Furman changed the world of capital sentencing, but, at least initially, appeared to leave Williams's simple line intact.
Under post-Furman death-penalty statutes, 166 the guilt phase and penalty
phase seemed to match up nicely with the two Sixth Amendment worlds
that Williams had created.
In the last decade, however, trouble has emerged at the Sixth
Amendment border between trial and sentencing. Apprendi v. New Jersey
warned that legislative labels distinguishing "sentencing factors" from elements of an offense no longer control that border. 16 7 Ring v. Arizona
followed in short order, drawing a line between trial and capital sentencing that no longer matches up with the typical statutory line between a
guilt phase and a penalty phase. 168 Initially, Ring caused a minor reshuffling in states that entrust capital sentencing to judges rather than ju162. See Steiker & Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts, supra note 8, at 397 ("[C]lose
examination of the Court's decisions over the past twenty years reveals that the procedural
safeguards in death cases are not as different as one might suspect.").
163. 468 U.S. at 459.
164. 337 U.S. at 246.
165. Id. at 244.
166. The Georgia statute at issue in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), is typical
of the post-Furman statutes. It bifurcates the case into a guilt phase and a single penalty
phase. Id. at 158.
167. 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000) (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 86
(1985)).
168. 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (holding that sentencing judge alone cannot find
aggravating circumstances because they are like elements of offense and must be found by
jury under Sixth Amendment).
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ries. 1 69 In the longer run, as a few cases are just beginning to signal, 1 70
Ring's impact will stretch beyond the question of jury sentencing to encompass all Sixth Amendment rights at capital sentencing, most significandy the right of confrontation and its corresponding limits on hearsay.
For that reason, Ring will impact rules of evidence and procedure at sentencing in every death-penalty jurisdiction, not just those few who leave
sentencing to judges. Finally, Blakely v. Washington 17 l and United States v.
Booker 172 raise the prospect of even more fundamental realignments of
the Sixth Amendment border between trial and sentencing in capital
cases.
In this Part, I will highlight some of the troublesome questions that
Ring, Blakely, and Booker are beginning to raise. I do not propose to offer
point-by-point answers to all of those questions because, in my view, the
questions themselves are unnecessary and inappropriate in the context of
capital sentencing. My more modest aim is simply to demonstrate the
turmoil, inconsistency, and fragmentation that is inevitable when we seek
to apply two sets of Sixth Amendment rules to the series of complex,
overlapping decisions that post-Furman death-penalty litigation has
spawned.
A. Ring v. Arizona: Drawing the Line Between Two Worlds
Under Furman's system of guided discretion, capital sentencing is
governed by an elaborate body of Eighth Amendment law requiring two
basic steps. The first step is to narrow the class of guilty defendants subject to the death penalty and to do so in a rational and nonarbitrary
way. 173 To satisfy this step, in the wake of Furman, death-penaltyjurisdictions adopted statutes listing "aggravating factors" that purport to define
crimes so serious and defendants so reprehensible or dangerous that they
are especially deserving of death.1 7 4 Under the typical death-penalty statute, the finding of one or more such factors makes a defendant "eligible"
169. As a result of Ring, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, and Indiana amended their
statutes to provide for jury sentencing. Shapiro, supra note 20, at 650. Delaware,
Montana, and Nebraska chose trifurcated proceedings which feature a guilt phase, an
eligibility phase, and a selection phase. Id. at 650-51.
170. See United States v. Jordan, 357 F. Supp. 2d 889, 903 (E.D. Va.2005) (ruling in
limine that sentencing hearing must be split into separate phases because confrontation
rights would exclude certain hearsay at eligibility phase but not at selection phase); United
States v. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d 469, 489 (D. Vt. 2002) (finding Federal Death Penalty Act
unconstitutional for failure to include evidentiary standards consistent with confrontation
right during death-eligibility determination), vacated, 360 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2004).
171. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
172. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
173. See Lowenield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244-45 (1988); Zant v. Stephens, 462
U.S. 862, 877 (1983); Gregg v.Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (plurality opinion).
174. See Steiker & Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts, supra note 8, at 372-73
(exploring narrowing doctrine and noting that death eligibility has remained remarkably
broad as some states' lists of "aggravating factors" could arguably extend to every murder).
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for a death sentence. 175 The second step requires the sentencer to con176
At
sider a broader range of information and to exercise discretion.
this stage, the sentencer must consider all aggravating and mitigating factors surrounding the defendant and his offense, in order to determine
whether death is the appropriate sentence.' 7 7 In theory then, arbitrariness is avoided by a narrowing process at the eligibility stage, while individualization and an opportunity for mercy are preserved at the selection
stage.
In the years after Furman and Gregg v. Georgia,178 all death-penalty
states abandoned unitary trials in favor of bifurcated proceedings that
separate the case into a "guilt" phase and a "penalty" phase.' 7 9 The federal system and most states now place both the eligibility and selection
determinations in a single penalty phase. 180 And, at least until very recently, the Sixth Amendment border between trial rights and sentencing
rights fell just where states had drawn the statutory line between the guilt
phase and the penalty phase.
Then came Ring v. Arizona.'8 1 In most respects, Arizona had a typical death-penalty statute in the mold described above. The key difference
was that Arizona, like a minority of death-penalty states, sent the jury
82
home after the guilt phase and left the sentencing phase to the judge.1
Timothy Ring was found guilty of felony murder by a jury. But, under
found
Arizona law, he was eligible for the death penalty only if the8 judge
3
at least one aggravating circumstance listed in the statute.1
175. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d) (2000) ("If no aggravating factor .. .is found to
");see also Zant, 462 U.S. at
exist, the court shall impose a sentence other than death ....
878 (noting that statutory aggravating factors "circumscribe the class of persons eligible for
the death penalty").
176. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982).
177. In effect, the selection step is required under Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 304-05 (1976), which struck down mandatory death penalties and required
consideration of each individual defendant's character and circumstance. See infra text
accompanying note 230.
178. 428 U.S. at 190 (suggesting bifurcation of capital cases to allow for admissibility
at sentencing of evidence relating to defendant's character).
179. See Beth S. Brinkmann, Note, The Presumption of Life: A Starting Point for a
Due Process Analysis of Capital Sentencing, 94 Yale LJ. 351, 366 (1984).
180. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593; Shapiro, supra note 20, at 647-51.
181. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
182. Id. at 592.
183. Id. at 591-92. Ring was one of three suspects in the robbery of an armored car
that resulted in the killing of the driver. At the guilt phase, there had been no evidence to
identify Ring as the shooter or as a leader in the criminal plot. Before Ring's sentencing
hearing, however, one of his codefendants agreed to cooperate with authorities in
exchange for a reduced sentence. At the sentencing phase, that codefendant testified that
Ring was both the leader and the shooter, and that Ring had bragged about his murderous
act. Relying largely on that new information and the findings at trial, the judge was able to
determine that Ring was the killer and that he exhibited reckless disregard for human life
as a major participant in the felony. The judge further found, as statutory aggravating
factors, that Ring killed "for pecuniary gain" and that the killing was "especially heinous,
cruel or depraved." Id. at 592-95. Those findings made Ring eligible for the death
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In the Supreme Court, Ring argued that Arizona violated the Sixth
Amendment's jury trial requirement when it entrusted the judge with
findings of fact that were necessary to expose him to a death sentence.
Ring's argument was a narrow one. He did not contend that the Sixth
Amendment granted a right to jury sentencing.' 8 4 Instead, he argued in
essence that Arizona had drawn the line between trial and sentencing in
the wrong place. Ring contended that the death-eligibility decision, to
the extent that it requires further factfinding, was subject to the Sixth
8 5
Amendment right to trial by jury.1
The Court agreed. Indeed, it had little choice in light of recent precedent. Two years earlier the Court held in Apprendi v. New Jersey that
"any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum" is, in effect, an "element" of the offense.' 8 6 Accordingly, such facts "must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."' 8 7 The Court's task in Ring was to apply Apprendi to Arizona's capital sentencing statute. Under that statute, Ring could not be
punished by death unless the court found at least one statutory aggravating factor.18 8 The result under Apprendi was clear.' 8 9 "Because Arizona's
enumerated aggravating factors operate as 'the functional equivalent of
an element of a greater offense,"' Ring held, "the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury." 190
After Apprendi and Ring, the simple line that divided trial from sentencing in Williams no longer looks so simple. 191 In the capital sentencpenalty. The judge then considered the aggravating factors in conjunction with the single
mitigating factor of Ring's minimal criminal record and sentenced Ring to death. Id.
184. See id. at 597 n.4 ("Nor does [defendant] argue that the Sixth Amendment
required the jury to make the ultimate determination whether to impose the death
penalty.").
185. Id.
186. 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). Apprendi pled guilty to possession of a firearm for an
unlawful purpose. His sentence was extended by the judge, who applied a "hate crime
enhancement," sentencing Apprendi to twelve years based on his finding that Apprendi
had been motivated by racial animus. Id. at 470-73. The United States Supreme Court
struck down the sentence, holding that the hate crime enhancement, which New Jersey
had called a sentencing "enhancer," was in effect a separate, aggravated crime with an
additional element. Id. at 495-97.
187. Id. The Court made an exception for facts establishing prior convictions. Id. at
487-90.
188. Ring, 536 U.S. at 593.
189. Indeed, in light of Apprendi, the outcome in Ring would have been easy to
predict had it not been for Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 647-49 (1990). In Walton the
Court had upheld the same Arizona statute against essentially the same Sixth Amendment
attack. In Ring, the Court was stuck with two conflicting precedents. It chose Apprendi and
overruled Walton. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
190. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n.19).
191. "Rather than squinting at the formerly clear line between guilt and punishment
...
it would be better to accept the need for bifocals, and acknowledge that the [capital
sentencing proceeding] has both features of a traditional trial and features of a traditional
sentencing." United States v. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d 469, 483 (D. Vt. 2002), vacated, 360 F.3d
135 (2d Cir. 2004).
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ing world, Ring tells us we can no longer rely on legislative decisions that
assign some facts to the guilt phase and others to the sentencing phase.
If the fact is essential to bring the death penalty into play, it is effectively
an element of an aggravated offense and must be found by a jury.
Under most death-penalty statutes, then, the somewhat awkward effect of Ring is to redraw the Sixth Amendment border between the world
of trial and the world of sentencing at a place that is different from the
line the statute has drawn between the guilt phase and the penalty phase.
Until the defendant is found guilty, of course, he enjoys full Sixth
Amendment trial rights. But after Ring, the eligibility finding must satisfy
the Sixth Amendment rules of the trial world as well, even though a state
statute may place that finding in the sentencing phase. Still, the final
selection phase remains in the world of sentencing, subject only to a
watered-down version of constitutional protection.
B. Ring's Unexamined Impact: Those Other Sixth Amendment Rights
Ring is all about one Sixth Amendment right: the right to trial by
jury. But its impact goes well beyond the right to a jury. Ring means that
a defendant contesting facts which may expose him to death is entitled
notjust to a jury, as Ring explicitly decided, but to the Sixth Amendment
rights of notice, confrontation, compulsory process, and speedy and public trial as well. 192 To reach this conclusion, we need not go so far as to
say that wherever one Sixth Amendment right applies, all the others apply as well. We already know that the Court thinks otherwise. Instead,
this conclusion flows logically from Ring's statement that a fact that elevates the potential maximum punishment is the "functional equivalent of
an element"' 9 3 of a crime. Whatever else the Sixth Amendment covers,
there can be little doubt that it applies, in all respects, at a proceeding
before ajury where adversaries contest elements of a criminal offense. If
the "entire panoply of criminal trial procedural rights" 19 4 do not apply in
that context, it is hard to imagine when they would apply.
The Court itself acknowledged the broader implications of Ring in
Schriro v. Summerlin.19 5 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, described
Ring as holding "that, because Arizona's statutory aggravators restricted (as
a matter of state law) the class of death-eligible defendants, those ag192. See United States v. Jordan, 357 F. Supp. 2d 889, 903 (E.D. Va. 2005) (applying
Confrontation Clause to eligibility issues at sentencing in light of Ring); Fell, 217 F. Supp.
2d at 489 (holding FDPA unconstitutional because its evidentiary standards at sentencing
fail to comply with Confrontation Clause); see also Steiker, Things Fall Apart, supra note
20, at 1481 ("If the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial applies to aggravating
circumstances, what about the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause?"); Adam
Thurschwell, After Ring, 15 Fed. Sent'g Rep. 97, 102 (2002) (suggesting, in light of Ring,
that all Sixth Amendment rights now extend to sentencing proceedings where aggravating
factors are at issue).
193. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n.19).
194. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 n.9 (1977).
195. 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004).
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gravators effectively were elements for federal constitutional purposes, and
so were subject to the procedural requirements the Constitution attaches
to trial of elements. 1 9 6 It was not a slip of the pen, I suggest, when the
Court wrote of "procedural requirements" collectively without distinguishing among them. After Ring, any proceeding to determine death
eligibility is, in effect, a trial where the defendant enjoys all Sixth Amendment rights.

Most notable among those other Sixth Amendment rights is the
right of confrontation. At trial, the Confrontation Clause not only requires live testimony subject to cross-examination, but places a constitutional limit on hearsay as well. 19 7 That constitutional limit stands in stark
contrast to the evidentiary rules-or, perhaps more accurately, the absence of evidentiary rules-that developed in capital sentencing proceed198
ings in most death-penalty jurisdictions following Williams.
At capital sentencing hearings, Ring means that sentencing courts
must limit hearsay to satisfy the Confrontation Clause, at least insofar as
that hearsay affects the death-eligibility decision t9 9 And the Court's latest confrontation-hearsay decision, Crawford v. Washington, may limit
20 0
hearsay in ways that are particularly significant to capital sentencing.
For example, it is not unusual at capital sentencing for prosecutors to rely
on summary testimony from police or probation officers to prove facts
relating to uncharged crimes or other misconduct by the defendant, or to
show his future dangerousness. 20 1 Similarly, in federal capital sentencings, prosecutors have sought to use hearsay statements made to police by
196. Id. at 2524.
197. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 80-85.
199. See United States v. Jordan, 357 F. Supp. 2d 889, 903 (E.D. Va. 2005) (splitting
sentencing phase into eligibility stage and selection stage and applying Confrontation
Clause to eligibility stage).
200. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). For decades, the Court held that hearsay satisfied the
Confrontation Clause as long as the hearsay possessed "indicia of reliability" that matched
up, roughly, with the traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts,
448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). Thus, the Confrontation Clause typically required no more than
the law of evidence. And evidence law in turn has become remarkably generous toward
prosecution hearsay. See generally John G. Douglass, Balancing Hearsay and Criminal
Discovery, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 2097, 2106-33 (2000).
But Crawford announced a sea change in confrontation-hearsay doctrine. Under
Crawford, "testimonial" hearsay, which apparently includes most statements made to law
enforcement officers in the course of an investigation, see 541 U.S. at 52, violates the
Confrontation Clause unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant has had an
opportunity to cross-examine. Id. at 68. Thus, summary testimony presented by police
and probation officers at sentencings would almost certainly run afoul of Crawford if the
Confrontation Clause applied at sentencing as it does at trial. After Crawford, the gap
between trial rights and sentencing rights, at least as far as confrontation is concerned, is
now wider than ever.
201. See, e.g., People v. Moore, 662 N.E.2d 1215, 1232-33 (Ill. 1996) (allowing deputy
sheriff to testify at capital sentencing that correctional officer told him that defendant had
attacked other officers).
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informants or accomplices. 20 2 Those forms of hearsay-all previously
sanctioned by Williams-areprecisely the kinds of evidence that are constitutionally barred under Crawford. As a result, Ring and Crawford together put serious limits on the most popular forms of hearsay in prosecutors' death-sentencing arsenal, at least where death eligibility is at issue.
Under the death-penalty statutes of many jurisdictions, the confrontation-hearsay rules imposed by Ring will prove even more complex. Ring
extends Sixth Amendment protection only to the death-eligibility determination. But in federal capital cases and in most states, the sentencer
addresses both eligibility and selection at a single penalty-phase hearing.
In effect, Ring calls on those courts to apply two different hearsay rules in
the same penalty proceeding. When prosecutors seek to prove aggravating circumstances required for death eligibility, Crawford and the Confrontation Clause provide the evidentiary standard. When they seek to
prove aggravating facts not essential to eligibility, or when they respond
to mitigating evidence offered by the defense, Williams provides the stan20 3
dard and puts virtually no constitutional limit on their use of hearsay.
Thus, before the judge can rule on a sentencing-phase objection to hearsay, she must first determine whether the hearsay goes to eligibility, selec2 04
tion, or both.
In some instances, conducting a single proceeding under two different hearsay rules may not prove all that difficult. For example, if the sole
statutory aggravator is the fact that the defendant was incarcerated at the
time he killed, it should be simple enough to distinguish evidence offered to prove that fact from other evidence offered at sentencing. But
where the prosecution seeks to prove death eligibility because the killing
was "outrageously or wantonly vile," or because the defendant poses a
"continuing serious threat to society," 20 5 it may be virtually impossible to
distinguish death-eligibility evidence from selection evidence.
One solution to the problem of inconsistent Confrontation Clause
rules at sentencing would be to realign capital cases by assigning all eligibility factfinding to the guilt phase, thereby freeing the penalty phase
from Sixth Amendment constraints. In his concurring opinion in Ring,
Justice Scalia suggested that solution: "placing the aggravating-factor de202. See Jordan, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 899 (considering, for purposes of sentencing,
prosecution's proffer of videotaped statement of eyewitness); United States v. Fell, 217 F.
Supp. 2d 469, 485 (D. Vt. 2002) (considering government's proffer of statement made by
deceased codefendant), vacated, 360 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2004).
203. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949).
204. In the wake of Ring, at least two federal courts have proposed splitting the
sentencing hearing into an eligibility phase and a selection phase in order to
accommodate two different standards for admitting hearsay. See Jordan,357 F. Supp. 2d at
889, 903 (citing United States v. Simmons, No. 5:04CR314-01 (W.D. Va. 2005)
(unpublished decision)).
205. The quoted passages are death-eligibility criteria in Virginia. See Va. Code Ann.
§ 19.2-264.2 (2004).
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20 6
Of
termination (where it logically belongs anyway) in the guilt phase.
course, that kind of realignment would solve one problem by creating
another. It would reopen the various evidentiary conflicts that led courts
to abandon unitary trials in favor of bifurcated proceedings in the first
20 7
place.
Some state legislatures responded to Ring by "trifurcating" their capital cases into (1) a guilt phase before a jury, (2) a death-eligibility phase
before the same jury, and (3) a selection phase before the judge sitting
without a jury. 20 8 Trifurcation avoids the problem of inconsistent Sixth
Amendment rules in a single proceeding. It also avoids the prejudice to
the defendant that would come from litigating some kinds of aggravating
factors before a jury that is simultaneously considering the question of
guilt. But trifurcation also demonstrates how easy it can be to marginalize the jury's role at capital sentencing. Under current Sixth Amendment
doctrine, as long as the jury finds a single aggravating factor necessary to
establish death eligibility, the judge might base her selection decision on
aggravating facts that the jury rejected at the eligibility stage. 2 09 In Ring,
Justice Scalia bemoaned the decline of our nation's commitment to the
criminal jury as an institution and wrote, "That decline is bound to be
confirmed, and indeed accelerated, by the repeated spectacle of a man's
going to his death because a judge found that an aggravating factor existed. '210 It is hard to imagine a situation more likely to diminish the
stature of trial by jury than "the spectacle of a man's going to his death"
based on facts rejected by a jury. Yet, Ring and trifurcation may increase
the likelihood that we will see such cases.

C. Ring's Ripple Effects: How ChargingDecisions by Prosecutors Can Limit
Sixth Amendment Protection at Capital Sentencing
Constitutional adjudication often creates ripple effects, unintended
consequences that stem from choices made by litigants or legislatures in
response to the Court's rulings. One troubling ripple effect of Ring is
that it can make a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights at the sentencing
206. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 613 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring).
207. See Note, Admissibility, supra note 58, at 716-17 (describing conflict between
evidentiary rules limiting character evidence at trial and need for broader admissibility of
character evidence for sentencing). Justice Scalia's solution would prove impractical and
unfair in a variety of contexts. For example, imagine the predicament of a defendant if
statutory aggravators relating to past crimes or future dangerousness were submitted to the
jury at the same time as the question of guilt.
208. See supra note 25. For a discussion of Nebraska's trifurcated system, see State v.
Gales, 658 N.W.2d 604, 626-28 (Neb. 2003).
209. There is nothing in Ring that would preclude a court from considering facts at
the selection stage that were rejected by a jury. And the Court's permissive approach to
"acquitted conduct" in noncapital sentencing suggests that neither due process nor double
jeopardy principles would prohibit a court from considering such facts. See United States
v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997).
210. Ring, 536 U.S. at 612 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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phase depend upon choices that rest in the hands of the prosecutor.
This fact gives prosecutors an incentive to make choices that will limit
Sixth Amendment protection for many defendants. To see how this process might play out, we need only look at a capital case from the perspective of the prosecutor at the time she chooses how to frame her indictment and death-penalty notice.
Imagine a case, similar to Ring, where a defendant and his accomplice killed a security guard in the course of an armed robbery. Call the
defendant "Dan." Imagine further that the accomplice confessed to the
police, saying that Dan laughed as he tortured and killed the victim. The
only catch is that, unlike in Ring, the accomplice is now either dead, unavailable, or takes the Fifth. Thus, the prosecutor knows she has powerful
evidence to convince a sentencer to vote death, but she also knows that
hearsay evidence is inadmissible in a proceeding where the Confrontation Clause applies. 2 11 Our prosecutor is contemplating a capital murder
charge under a typical death-penalty statute which, like Arizona's, lists a
host of statutory aggravating factors and makes the defendant eligible for
death upon proof of any one of them. And, just as in Arizona, the statutory aggravators include the following: (a) that defendant killed for pecuniary gain, and (b) that the killing was "in an especially heinous, cruel
or depraved manner. '2 12 How will our prosecutor craft her death-penalty
notice in order to maximize the likelihood of a death sentence?
The answer is that she will craft it in such a way that the Sixth
Amendment will not stop her from using the accomplice's hearsay statement, even though Dan will never have the opportunity to see, hear, and
cross-examine the accomplice. Under Ring, she has the power to do just
that. If her death-penalty notice lists two statutory aggravators-pecuniary gain and "depraved manner"-her hearsay likely will be barred at sentencing by the Confrontation Clause, because it is relevant to prove a
fact-depraved manner-which goes to the eligibility determination.
But if she lists "pecuniary gain" as her sole statutory aggravating factor,
then the Sixth Amendment will not affect the admissibility of that powerful hearsay, because the hearsay has nothing to do with the only fact necessary to make Dan eligible for death. Instead, under her more narrowly
framed charge, the hearsay now goes only to the selection determination,
where Sixth Amendment rules do not apply and hearsay is welcome
under Williams,2 13 She can ensure that her hearsay will be relevant and
211. The facts outlined in the hypothetical are not entirely fictional. See United
States v. Jordan, 357 F. Supp. 2d 889, 903-05 (E.D. Va. 2005) (considering admissibility at
capital sentencing of grand jury testimony and videotaped statement of eyewitness who
committed suicide); United States v. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d 469, 485 (D. Vt. 2002)
(considering admissibility at capital sentencing of statement made by deceased
codefendant), vacated, 360 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2004).
212. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 592 n.1 (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(G) (West
Supp. 2001) (current version at Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(F) (West Supp. 2004))).
213. See supra text accompanying note 51.
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admissible for the selection decision merely by identifying the defendant's laughter and acts of torture as nonstatutory aggravating factors.
In this manner, our imaginary prosecutor can limit the coverage of
the Sixth Amendment by carefully crafting her charging decision. Indeed, Ring gives her a powerful incentive to do exactly that. Ring extends
full Sixth Amendment protection to the death-eligibility determination
but not to the ultimate selection of who lives and who dies. 2 14 Accordingly, where full Sixth Amendment trial rights pose an impediment to the
prosecutor's goal of a death sentence, we can anticipate charging decisions that make fewer facts relevant to eligibility and more facts relevant
to selection. And Ring leaves state legislatures with considerable power to
define death-eligibility facts in ways that make such tactical choices even
more readily available to prosecutors.
In sum, by tying Sixth Amendment rights to death-eligibility factfinding, Ring puts significant new power into the hands of legislators and
prosecutors to control the rules of the Sixth Amendment playing field
where life and death issues are contested. It also creates a level of inconsistency in capital sentencing rights among similarly situated defendants
where the only real difference is a prosecutor's tactical choice. The Ring
majority wrote that "[t]he right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment would be senselessly diminished" if that right did not en'2 15
compass "the factfinding necessary to put [the defendant] to death.
Yet Ring leaves prosecutors with broad discretion to limit the "factfinding
necessary to put [the defendant] to death" while often leaving the most
crucial factfinding-the factfinding that really leads a sentencer to impose death-beyond the protection of the Sixth Amendment.
D. Blakely and Booker: Loose Language? Or an Earthquake at the Sixth
Amendment Border?
Efforts at constitutional line drawing inevitably create troublesome
questions in gray areas near constitutional borders. Ring is no exception.
Ring tries to draw a bright line between factfinding necessary to establish
eligibility for death, on one side, and the final exercise of sentencing discretion-the selection step-on the other. But identifying which
factfindings fall on which side of the line is not always as easy as scanning
a state statute to identify "statutory aggravating factors." In felony-murder
cases, for example, the Eighth Amendment forbids capital punishment
absent findings that the defendant was "a major participant" in the felony
and that he exhibited "reckless indifference to human life."'216 Under
Ring, therefore, it would seem that such findings must be made by ajury
beyond a reasonable doubt. But Ring itself was a felony-murder case
214. See supra text accompanying notes 184-191.
215. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
216. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,
801 (1982).
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where the sentencing judge made these "Enmund/Tison" findings himself,
without the benefit of a jury.2 1 7 Nevertheless, the Court never said-at
least explicitly-that such findings exceeded the judge's authority under
the Sixth Amendment. And, after remand, the Arizona Supreme Court
held that Enmund/Tison findings need not be made by ajury because they
are not "elements" but merely factors that satisfy the "proportionality"
demands of the Eighth Amendment.2 18 Whatever the wisdom of that ruling, it illustrates the kind of line-drawing problems that Ring has
9
spawned. Other similar dilemmas, no doubt, will follow7'
The difficult line-drawing problems spawned by Apprendi and Ring
have been further complicated by the Court's latest efforts to define the
Sixth Amendment border between trial and sentencing. Blakely v. Washington220 and United States v. Booker221 struck down mandatory sentencing
guideline schemes that left to judges, rather than juries, the factfinding
necessary to elevate the maximum sentence a court could impose. Of
course, neither Blakely nor Booker was a capital case. But their implications for capital sentencing are intriguing at the least, and monumental if
the Court really meant what it said.
Writing for a five-Justice majority in Blakely, Justice Scalia began with
Apprendi's now familiar mantra that "any fact that increases the penalty
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum" is, in effect, an
element of an offense and, accordingly, must be proved to ajury in order
to satisfy the Sixth Amendment. 22 2 In Blakely, Justice Scalia added, "the
,statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a
judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the juy verdict or
admitted by the defendant."223 He continued, "In other words, the relevant
'statutory maximum' is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose
after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without
any additional findings." 224 Interpreting, or perhaps expanding on, Apprendi and Ring, Justice Scalia wrote that Blakely's sentence violated the
Sixth Amendment because "the jury's verdict alone does not authorize
the sentence. '225 Booker followed predictably in Blakely's Sixth Amendment footsteps, striking down the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for es-

217. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 594.
218. See State v. Ring, 65 P.3d 915, 944-46 (Ariz. 2003).
219. In light of Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), one open question is whether
the Sixth Amendment allows ajudge, rather than ajury, to determine whether a defendant
is mentally retarded. See Steiker, Things Fall Apart, supra note 20, at 1482.
220. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).

221. 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005).
222. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2536 (quoting Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490

(2000)).
223. Id. at 2537.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 2538.

2004

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 105:1967

sentially the same reasons that Blakely had invalidated Washington's sen226
tencing scheme.
When applied to capital cases, the language of Blakely2 2 7 suggests a
significant expansion upon Ring. Arguably, Blakely extends the reach of
the Sixth Amendment beyond the death-eligibility determination to
reach any factfinding that matters at capital sentencing, including those
findings that contribute to the final selection process. In the language of
Blakely, nojudge-orjury for that matter-may impose death "solely on the
basis of the facts reflected" in the finding of death eligibility. 228 Moreover,
"the jury's verdict alone [at the eligibility stage] does not authorize the
sentence" of death. 229 The reason is that, under both Eighth Amendment case law and state statutes that attempt to follow those cases, "additional findings" are required at the selection stage, after the eligibility
finding is made. In striking down mandatory death penalties, Woodson v.
North Carolina held that "in capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment requires consideration of the
character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of
the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death. '2 30 In my view, outside of unusual
cases where there are no disputes about facts that may contribute to the
selection process, there is no way to satisfy the constitutional mandate of
Woodson without making "additional findings."
An example helps illustrate both the possibilities and the uncertainties that arise when we apply Blakely in the world of capital sentencing.
Imagine an armed robbery-for simplicity's sake, not charged as a felony
murder-where a lone robber intentionally kills his victim in the course
of stealing a wallet. To simplify matters, imagine a capital murder prosecution where the state alleges a single statutory aggravating factor: that
the defendant killed "for pecuniary gain." Imagine a trial in three stages:
a guilt phase, an eligibility phase, and a selection phase. At the guilt
phase the jury's verdict necessarily finds that the defendant robbed and
killed the victim. At the eligibility stage, the jury's verdict explicitly finds
that the defendant acted for pecuniary gain. Now comes the selection
stage, and the big question under Blakely is: Can the sentencer impose
death "without any additional findings?" After Blakely, I suggest there are
at least three plausible answers to that question: (1) No; (2) Yes; and (3)
Maybe. Here is why:
(1) No. Our defendant cannot be sentenced to death without additional findings. After Furman, Woodson, and Lockett v. Ohio, no death sentence can ever be imposed even on a death-eligible defendant until the
226. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 769.
227. Because Booker adds little of substance to Blakely's Sixth Amendment analysis, I
refer only to Blakely throughout the rest of this Part.
228. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537.
229. Id. at 2538.
230. 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (citation omitted).
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sentencer considers "any aspect of a defendant's character or record and
any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a
basis for a sentence less than death." 23 ' Except in the rare case where all
relevant aspects of a defendant's character and all circumstances of the
offense are admitted or established at trial or in the eligibility phase,
there is no way for a sentencer to "consider" them without first findingas a matter of fact-that they do or do not exist. The "weighing" or "selection" process required by the Eighth Amendment cannot occur without those "additional findings." 23 2 In our hypothetical, to rule otherwise
is to say, in effect, that the sentencer can view an armed-robbery killing as
deserving mandatory death without regard to any other circumstances.
Woodson and Lockett prohibit a death sentence imposed on that basis.
(2) Yes. Our death-eligible robber-murderer can be sentenced to
death "without additional findings" as Blakely uses that phrase. 2 33 Under
Ring, there is still a constitutionally significant difference between facts
sufficient to expose a defendant to death, and facts that actually lead a
sentencer to impose death. The findings required by Woodson and Lockett
do nothing to elevate the maximum penalty that an already death-eligible
defendant faces. If Blakely's broad language suggests otherwise, it is just
dictum. To hold otherwise is to conclude that Blakely overruled both
Spaziano and Williams without saying so.
(3) Maybe. It seems at least plausible that Blakely might, or might
not, extend Sixth Amendment protection to our hypothetical defendant,
depending upon whether the sentencer finds it necessary to make any
additional factfinding before he can exercise sentencing discretion.
Blakely allows ajudge to impose death on our death-eligible defendant as
long as he can do so without finding any additional facts not established
at the eligibility stage. So let's return to our hypothetical. Imagine that,
aside from the facts established by the guilty verdict and eligibility verdict-i.e., the fact that the defendant robbed and killed his victim for
pecuniary gain-the prosecution has nothing further to offer at sentencing. Imagine that, in mitigation, the defendant proffers only that he was
drunk at the time of the shooting. Now imagine that our sentencer con231. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
232. The Federal Death Penalty Act further illustrates the problem. The FDPA
requires the sentencer to find at least one statutory aggravating factor in order to make a
defendant eligible for death. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d) (2000). In addition, the FDPA requires
the sentencer to make and record findings of fact regarding other aggravating and
mitigating factors before determining whether the aggravating factors "found to exist"
outweigh the mitigating factors "found." Id. With the possible exception of cases where
neither party has identified an aggravating or mitigating factor beyond the factor(s)
determining eligibility, this scheme does not authorize the sentencer to impose death
without making-and explicitly recording-additional findings beyond those necessary for
death eligibility. Thus, in my view, sentencing under the FDPA would violate the Sixth
Amendment unless the court accords the defendant full Sixth Amendment rightsincluding, most significantly, the right to restrict hearsay under the Confrontation
Clause-throughout the sentencing hearing.
233. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537.
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cludes that, even assuming the factual accuracy of the defendant's claim
of drunkenness, death is still the appropriate sentence. Under these circumstances, our sentencing judge can comply with Blakely, because he
can impose death without any additional factfinding. And he can comply
with Woodson and Lockett, because he has considered all facts and circumstances proffered by the defendant. In other words, the sentencer can
make his final selection decision without any factfinding beyond what occurred at trial and at the eligibility phase.
But now let's change the facts a bit. Imagine our death-eligible defendant proffers that at the time of the offense his judgment was clouded
by prescription painkillers to which he had become addicted. Imagine
that our sentencer concludes that, if true, the facts of the defendant's
clouded judgment and addiction are sufficiently mitigating to result in a
life sentence. The prosecutor protests, saying she knows of no facts to
support defendant's claims. To resolve the factual dispute, the judge
spurns open-court proceedings and asks for a presentence report. Based
on a probation officer's report summarizing police reports and other collected hearsay, the judge concludes that the defendant was not really addicted or impaired. Rejecting-as a matter of fact-the mitigating factors proffered by the defendant, the judge imposes death. Under these
circumstances, the judge did not impose death without additional
factfinding. And, I suggest, he could not do so and still fulfill his Eighth
Amendment responsibility under Woodson and Lockett to consider the
proffered mitigating facts. His failure to allow confrontation and submit
the pivotal factfinding to a jury would violate the Sixth Amendment.
If my hypothetical debate over Blakely brings to mind angels dancing
on the head of a pin, then perhaps I have made my point. When we
overlay complex doctrines of Eighth Amendment law with the equally
complex questions posed by Apprendi, Ring, and Blakely, we begin to see
how narrow and formalistic the Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence
has become in the world of capital sentencing.
If we step back a bit, it may be easier to see what is really at stake
when we try to draw a Sixth Amendment line somewhere in the middle of
a complex capital sentencing process. Ring draws that line after a finding
of death eligibility, but death-eligibility facts often have little to do with
the real reasons a sentencer might choose death. A defendant may be
eligible for death because he sought money when he killed, because he
was in jail when he killed, or because his victim was a teenager. But those
facts, standing alone, are seldom the reason a sentencer would choose
death. More likely, the real facts influencing the death sentence will be
something else: for example, that the defendant has a history of
23 4
unadjudicated violent crimes, or that he killed with gratuitous cruelty.
234. There are several fine studies of the factors that actually influence juries in lifeand-death decisions and how those factors often differ from the structured elements in
post-Furman jury instructions. See, e.g., William J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner,

20051

CONFRONTING DEATH

2007

Depending upon the circumstances, and perhaps depending upon the
prosecutor's tactical choices, these facts may play no formal role in the
eligibility decision and thus, under Ring, get no protection from the Sixth
Amendment. Similarly, the adjudication of mitigating facts, which may
play a critical role in the sentencer's decision, falls outside the Sixth
Amendment according to Ring. In all of the many death-penalty cases
where the real reasons for choosing life or death have little to do with a
statutory aggravating factor, Ring exalts form over substance because it
grants Sixth Amendment protection to the factfinding that matters least,
while denying that protection where heavily contested facts matter most.
The Court justifies its ruling in Blakely based on "the need to give
intelligible content to the right of jury trial." 23 5 If Blakely really does extend that right to all factfinding that contributes to a death sentencewhether it relates to eligibility or selection-then the Court may have succeeded in giving new and "intelligible content" to that Sixth Amendment
right. However, if Blakely means something less than that, then we are left
with Ring's more formalistic line, a line that still leaves the Sixth Amendment with little practical significance in many capital sentencings.
Stated a little differently, Ring tells us that the Sixth Amendment protects a defendant when we adjudicate facts that can lead to death. The
question, after Blakely, is whether it also protects him when we adjudicate
facts that do lead to death and facts that can lead to life. If, as a practical
matter, it seems odd that there should be any difference, then perhaps I
have achieved my goal here in Part II. Often there is no practical difference and, I suggest, there should be no Sixth Amendment difference,
between eligibility facts and selection facts. Blakely may have nudged us
ever so slightly toward a world where the Sixth Amendment governs all of
capital sentencing, but we are not there yet.
III. A UNIFIED THEORY OF SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS AT
CAPITAL SENTENCING

The Court's current approach to Sixth Amendment rights at capital
sentencing is a process of fragmentation heaped upon fragmentation.
The Court applies pieces of the Sixth Amendment to pieces of a capital
sentencing. Sometimes two sets of Sixth Amendment rights govern different issues in a single proceeding. As a practical matter, it is a system
that can provide the least protection at the moment it is most needed:
when the sentencer determines critical facts that tip the ultimate balance
between life and death. It is a system where adversarial rights may exist or
disappear based on choices made by an adversary. It is not, I suggest, a
system that many would design if given a clean slate and asked to produce
a fair, just, and accurate process for deciding who lives and who dies.
Choosing Life or Death: Sentencing Dynamics in Capital Cases, in America's Experiment,
supra note 9, at 309.
235. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2538.
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More importantly-since our task here is to interpret a constitution-it is
not a system that readily comes to mind upon reading the language of the
Sixth Amendment and considering that language in the context of its
history and purpose.
Instead, as I argue in this Part, all of the rights listed in the Sixth
Amendment should apply throughout a capital case, including the sentencing. This unified theory of Sixth Amendment rights flows naturally
from the constitutional text, which grants those rights without distinction
"in all criminal prosecutions. '23 6 A unified theory makes sense historically. The Framers lived in a system of capital litigation where a unitary
trial and a single jury verdict determined not only guilt or innocence, but
life or death as well. With that system as their point of reference, they
crafted a single set of adversarial rights to govern all of the proceedings
that might lead to the penalty of death. Finally, in the post-Furman age, a
unified theory ensures that full adversarial rights remain available when
they may be most essential: at the moment a defendant contests the question of life or death.
A. The Sixth Amendment Text
Plain meaning often is in the eye of the beholder. Mindful of that
limitation, I turn to a question that the Supreme Court has never explicitly addressed: What can the constitutional text tell us about Sixth
Amendment rights at capital sentencing?
The Sixth Amendment consists of a single sentence:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his237favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
All of the rights enumerated in the Sixth Amendment apply "in all
criminal prosecutions." If the textual question is simply whether a sentencing is part of a "criminal prosecution," the answer would seem selfevident. After all, why bother with the process of criminal prosecution if
not for the sentence? As one eminent jurist remarked: "If 'plain meaning' is the criterion, this is an easy case. Surely no one would contend
that sentencing is not a part, and a vital one, of a 'criminal
prosecution.' ",238
236. U.S. Const. amend. VI.

237. Id.
238. United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 407 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (Arnold, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Note, An Argument for Confrontation,
supra note 20, at 1888 (arguing that plain meaning of "criminal prosecution" includes
sentencing). Indeed, in a somewhat different context, the Supreme Court has found it
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Unfortunately, that "easy case" may prove too much, for it would require a full-blown jury trial for the most ordinary of noncapital sentencings. Regardless of its textual appeal, that notion seems doomed for practical reasons. It would invalidate practices that have been almost
universal in noncapital sentencings for over a century.
A closer look at the text suggests a distinction between the jury right,
which by the terms of the Amendment applies to a "trial," and the rights
to notice, confrontation, compulsory process, and counsel, which apply
more broadly to the whole "criminal prosecution," and thus to sentencing. This interpretation avoids the practical difficulty of requiring a jury
for every sentencing, while still protecting the basic adversarial rights of
confrontation, compulsory process, and counsel at sentencing. 239 In the
capital sentencing context, this reading of the text casts doubt on the
Court's approach to confrontation rights in Williams, which viewed the
basic rights to see, hear, and cross-examine witnesses as rights of "trial
procedure." 240 The Sixth Amendment text suggests those rights extend
24 1
beyond trial.
The Sixth Amendment text calls for a consistency that has not been
part of the Court's sentencing-rights doctrine. The text suggests that,
whenever the rights of notice, confrontation, compulsory process, and
counsel apply, they apply together. All of those rights are in the same
sentence, which, as a matter of simple grammar, lists them collectively as
the rights an accused "shall enjoy" "in all criminal prosecutions." There
is no textual reason for limiting the right of confrontation to trial, while
extending the right to counsel through all critical stages of a criminal
prosecution, including sentencing. Yet, as our discussion of Williams and
Mempa v. Rhay reveals, that is just what the Court has done. 24 2 At a minihard to resist the textual link between sentencing and "criminal prosecution." See
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972) (declining to apply Sixth Amendment to
parole revocation hearings because "[p]arole arises after the end of the criminal
prosecution, including imposition of sentence").
239. In the context of guideline sentencing, this reading has been favored by some
commentators who advocate greater adversarial rights in resolving factual disputes. See,
e.g., Beale, supra note 20, at 160-61 (taking view that trial is "but one part of the criminal
prosecution"); Note, An Argument for Confrontation, supra note 20, at 1889 n.70 (arguing
jury right applies to trial, but "not to other stages of prosecution").
240. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 251 (1949). Though Williams was a due
process opinion, it effectively has nullified Sixth Amendment confrontation rights at
sentencing. See supra note 54.
241. One also might rely on the Sixth Amendment text to argue that the
confrontation right applies in any proceeding where the prosecution relies on "witnesses
against" the accused. And, in light of recent authority, "witnesses against" an accused
include those hearsay declarants who provide "testimonial" hearsay through, for example,
affidavits, grand jury testimony, or statements in response to police questioning. See
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50-54 (2004). Thus, many declarants whose hearsay
is assembled in a presentence report or summarized at sentencing through the testimony
of a police officer are "witnesses against" the accused. The Sixth Amendment entities a
defendant to exclude such hearsay in the absence of confrontation.
242. See supra text accompanying notes 54-67, 122-124.
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mum, the Sixth Amendment text gives us a good reason to prefer consistency over the Court's fragmented approach.
The rights enumerated together in the Sixth Amendment share a
common purpose. 2 43 In the words of one constitutional historian, those
rights evolved as interdependent rights that establish an adversarial system, one that "was not dependent on any one right or procedure, but on
a confluence of advocacy tools that permitted the accused to challenge
the prosecution's case."'244 In other words, Sixth Amendment rights support each other. Without counsel, the right of cross-examination may be
an exercise in futility. Without the right to cross-examine the state's witnesses or to present favorable evidence, the right to counsel may be an
2 45
empty formalism.
It may be tempting to rely on the text for more than it will bear. The
right to ajury applies at trial, one might argue, and therefore thejury has
no constitutional role at sentencing. The problem with this reading is
that it assumes that the capital sentencing phase is not part of the trial.
Our twenty-first-century perspective may lead us too easily toward that assumption. After all, at least since Gregg v. Georgia, we have become accustomed to seeing "trial" and "sentencing" as separate parts of a bifurcated
proceeding. 246 But our frame of reference has shifted over two centuries.
Bifurcated proceedings in capital cases are a relatively recent phenomenon. The Framers "knew nothing of sentencing proceedings separate
from the trial itself. '2 47 History, then, requires us to view the "trial"
through a different lens. We turn to that history next.
B. Sixth Amendment History: An Integrated Set of Adversarial Rights for a
Unified World of Trial and Sentencing
In the Court's most recent exploration of Sixth Amendment history,
Justice Scalia wrote, "Any attempt to determine the application of a con243. The early history of those rights is not altogether a common history. There was,
for example, no right to counsel in felony cases in eighteenzh-century England. Randolph
N. Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An Alternative History, 27 Rutgers
L.J. 77, 82-83 (1995). Still, as Professor Langbein points out, the rights later enumerated
in the Sixth Amendment share a common history in that the development of one
influenced and encouraged development of the others. See Langbein, Origins, supra note
30, at 291 ("Cross-examining prosecution witnesses was the primary task for which the
judges admitted defense counsel to the felony trial.").
244. Jonakait, supra note 243, at 164-65.
245. "It has also been argued that the right to counsel at sentencing implies a right to
confrontation because exercise of the former is futile if it does not include the latter."
Note, An Argument for Confrontation, supra note 20, at 1889 n.70 (citing Herring v. New
York, 422 U.S. 853, 857 (1975)).
246. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190-91 (1976) (suggesting bifurcation of
capital cases to allow for admissibility at sentencing of evidence relating to defendant's
character). See generally infra text accompanying notes 309-313 (explaining existence of
bifurcation despite fact that practice is not constitutionally mandated).
247. United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 407 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (Arnold, CJ.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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stitutional provision to a phenomenon that did not exist at the time of its
adoption ... involves some degree of estimation . . . but that is hardly a
reason not to make the estimation as accurate as possible." 248 We are
faced with that kind of task when we try to determine whether Sixth
Amendment rights apply at capital sentencing because capital sentencing, as a phenomenon separate from trial, did not exist in the Framers'
world.
1. The Framers' World: Unified Proceedings Where the Jury Verdict Resulted
in a Sentence Fixed by Law. - Those who crafted the Bill of Rights had
little reason to consider "trial rights" separately from "sentencing rights"
in capital cases because, in effect, trial and sentencing were one. The
questions of guilt and punishment both were resolved in a single proceeding which ended with a singlejury verdict. Unified proceedings were
the norm because, at the time of the founding, the substantive criminal
law in England and America "tended to be sanction-specific; it prescribed
a particular sentence for each offense. ' 2 4 9 Trial concluded with a jury
verdict after which, in Blackstone's words, "the court must pronounce
that judgment, which the law hath annexed to the crime. '2 50 For a long
252
list of felonies, 251 the prescribed sentence was death.
In that world, there was no separate capital sentencing proceeding of
any consequence. A jury verdict for a capital offense was, in effect, a
death sentence. After a verdict, the court paused only for the defendant's
brief allocution, a process that involved neither additional factfinding nor
the exercise of sentencing discretion by judge or jury. 2 53 Pronouncement of sentence by the court was, for practical purposes, a ministerial
act.
It is tempting to rely on this history to argue that the Sixth Amendment contemplates no sentencing rights at all, because it contemplates
no separate sentencing proceeding. Put differently, if the Framers tolerated a system where the penalty was mandatory upon a finding of guilt,
248. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53 n.3 (2004).
249. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 479 (2000) (quoting Langbein, English
Criminal Trial Jury, supra note 34, at 36-37).
250. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *376, quoted in Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 479.
251. Whitnan J. Hou, Capital Retrials and Resentencing: Whether to Appeal and
Resentencing Fairness, 16 Cap. Def.J. 19, 30 (2003) (noting 222 crimes punished by death
in eighteenth-century England).
252. "At the time the Eighth Amendment was adopted in 1791, the States uniformly
followed the common law practice of making death the exclusive and mandatory sentence
for certain specified offenses." Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289 (1976)
(citing Hugo Adam Bedau, The Death Penalty in America: An Anthology 5-6, 15, 27-28
(rev. ed. 1967)).
253. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 228 n.7 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Note, Procedural Due Process, supra note 59, at 832-33) (describing
allocution merely as opportunity for defendant to present legal reason he should avoid
sentencing); Caren Myers, Note, Encouraging Allocution at Capital Sentencing: A
Proposal for Use Immunity, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 787, 798-99 (1997) (describing allocution
as right to present "any legal impediment to the execution of the sentence").
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then any process that allowed a sentencer to assign a lesser penalty to a
guilty defendant would be more generous than the Constitution required. This approach treats any exercise of sentencing discretion as an
2 54
undeserved act of mercy.
2 55
This interpretation of history is at the heart of Apprendi and Ring.
It assumes that the world of mandatory penalties was a world without sentencing discretion. In that world, legislators prescribed sentences, and
juries merely found facts that matched legislative definitions of the elements of a crime. But that assumption ignores a fundamental characteristic of unified seventeenth-century trials: the jury's role as capital
sentencer.
2. The Jury's Role as Capital Sentencer in a Unified System. - In eighteenth-century England and colonial America, the letter of the law often
called for more death than the people would tolerate. And the people
spoke through juries.
Early English common law recognized only a small number of capital
2 56
crimes, ranging from rape and murder to burglary and larceny.
Through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, legislation expanded
England's "Bloody Code" to include dozens more. By the reign of
257
George III, English law punished around 150 to 200 crimes with death.
The American colonists proved more reluctant to legislate death, but
early colonial efforts to limit capital punishment were defeated in the
eighteenth century when the Crown imposed stricter penal codes on the
colonists. 258 By the time of the Revolution, Americans were familiar with
a substantive criminal law that imposed mandatory death for a wide range
of crimes, but they were also familiar with a long history through which
juries had resisted the mechanistic application of that law by exercising
de facto sentencing discretion in a variety of ways.
Part of that history had been enshrined in the law of homicide.
Long before the eighteenth century, the law of homicide had merged the
jury's role as factfinder and its role as de facto sentencer. By choosing
254. In the nineteenth century, as the growth of a prison system allowed for judicial
discretion in noncapital cases, this "mercy" theme offered a basis for rejecting procedural
rights in the sentencing process. See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 561-62 (2002)
(plurality opinion) (citing 1 Joel Prentiss Bishop, Commentaries on the Law of Criminal
Procedure § 85, at 54 (2d ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1872)). As we have seen, the
theme ofjudicial mercy played a central role in Williams, where the Court found no reason
to limit a sentencer's use of out-of-court sources in considering a death sentence because,
as the Court put it, the sentencer could impose a death sentence "giving no reason at all."
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 252 (1949); see also supra text accompanying notes
65-67.
255. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 479-80.
256. The Death Penalty in America, supra note 59, at 6.
257. Id.; see also Hou, supra note 251, at 30 & n.93 (noting 222 capital crimes in
eighteenth-century England); Note, Admissibility, supra note 58, at 715 n.1 ("In
Blackstone's day Parliament had provided that the death sentence should be imposed in
not less than 160 different crimes.").
258. See The Death Penalty in America, supra note 59, at 7.
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between murder, which was punished by mandatory death, and manslaughter, which was not, 259 juries effectively made capital sentencing decisions. As a matter of form, of course, juries in homicide cases were
making factual determinations relating to "malice," the element that distinguished the two crimes. 260 As a practical matter, however, "the murkiness of the required factual determinations inevitably vested the jury with
considerable discretion. ''2 6 1 As a result, manslaughter convictions often
reflected a jury's judgment that death was not the appropriate penalty
under the circumstances of a particular homicide.
Outside of homicide cases, eighteenth-century juries had an even
clearer role in protecting against the prospect of death under rapidly expanding criminal codes. English statutes punished a variety of property
crimes by death, often distinguishing capital from noncapital crimes
based on the value of the stolen property. 262 In the decades surrounding
the American Revolution, the practice of juries issuing "partial verdicts"
or "downvaluing" stolen goods in order to avoid death sentences was
widespread, immortalized through Blackstone's colorful phrase, "pious
perjury. ' 263 Indeed, the practice was so commonplace that it "was largely
responsible for the virtual suspension of the operation of many capital
264
statutes."
In his well-documented history of the Anglo-American adversarial
trial, Professor Langbein argues that de facto jury sentencing often was
the principal purpose of an eighteenth-century jury trial:
The jury's power to mitigate sanctions profoundly affected the
purpose of the criminal trial for those many offenses in which
the jury might return a partial verdict. Only a small fraction of
eighteenth-century criminal trials were genuinely contested inquiries into guilt or innocence. In many cases, perhaps most,
the accused had been caught in the act or with the stolen goods
or otherwise had no credible defense. To the extent that trial
had a function in such cases beyond formalizing the inevitable
2 65
conclusion of guilt, it was to decide the sanction.
Aside from the fact that this kind of jury sentencing was widespread
by the American constitutional period, and that its clear aim was to protect against death sentences, three other aspects of this history bear par259. Id. at 6.
260. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 198 (1971) (discussing history of
concept of malice).
261. Welsh S. White, Fact-Finding and the Death Penalty: The Scope of a Capital
Defendant's Right to Jury Trial, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 8 (1989). Indeed, it was partly
the insistence of juries on exercising this kind of discretion that led to the murdermanslaughter distinction in the first place. See Thomas A. Green, The Jury and the
English Law of Homicide, 1200-1600, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 413, 415 (1976).
262. Leon Radzinowicz, A History of English Criminal Law and Its Administration
from 1750, at 94 (1948).
263. 4 Blackstone, supra note 250, at *239.
264. Radzinowicz, supra note 262, at 95.
265. Langbein, Origins, supra note 30, at 59.
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ticular note. First, it is quite clear from historical accounts that these juries were not merely finding facts; they were exercising sentencing
discretion. 26 6 Indeed, the practice of juries in issuing partial verdictsBlackstone's "pious perjury"-was remarkable precisely because those
verdicts were contrary to fact. 2 6 7 Second, the power ofjuries to exercise
this kind of sentencing discretion by issuing unreviewable verdicts, even if
contrary to the evidence, had become an accepted characteristic of jury
trials by the time of the American Constitution. 2 68 Earlier battles to curb
jury power through a variety of means-including directed verdicts, punishments for wayward juries, and limiting juries to special verdicts on limited issues of fact-had largely been defeated. 269 Third, the sentencing
role of juries was not confined to England. This fact was well known to
the Framers, both because juries exercised the same power in colonial
trials 2 70 and because the practice was documented by Blackstone, a
source quite familiar to American lawmakers. 27' If anything, the jury's
role as capital sentencer was even more entrenched in America than in
England. 272 Lawmakers in the First Congress, the same Congress that
passed the Bill of Rights, recognized and apparently respected the deathdefeating aspect of jury discretion. When Congress considered making
forgery a capital offense, the principal argument against the legislation
2 73
was that juries would not convict.
Eighteenth-century English and American juries exercised de facto
sentencing discretion as a means to resist overbroad application of the
death penalty. In a similar vein, the adversarial rights of notice, confron266. "Juries at the time of the framing could not be forced to produce mere 'factual
findings,' but were entitled to deliver a general verdict pronouncing the defendant's guilt
or innocence." United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 513 (1995) (citing Edmund M.
Morgan, A Brief History of Special Verdicts and Special Interrogatories, 32 Yale L.J. 575,
591 (1922)).
267. Perhaps the most prominent examples of jury verdicts contrary to fact are the
many cases where English juries refused to recognize the full value of stolen goods in order
to issue "partial verdicts" and thereby allow for punishment other than death. Professor
Langbein's study of cases at the Old Bailey in the 1750s suggests that juries returned such
partial verdicts nearly a quarter of the time. See Langbein, Origins, supra note 30, at
58-59.
268. See Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury's Constitutional
Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 33, 49-50 (2003).
269. See Langbein, Origins, supra note 30, at 328-31.
270. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289-90 (1976).
271. 4 Blackstone, supra note 250, at *239. Blackstone's text was in high demand
among lawyers in the American colonies during the decades leading up to independence.
See Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A
Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 557, 581-82 (1992).
272. See Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 Va. L. Rev. 311,
316-23 (2003).
273. 1 Annals of Cong. 1573-74 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). The legislation passed with
the death penalty for forgers. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 14, 1 Stat. 112, 115. But there
was never a suggestion that its efficacy should be enhanced by removing the capital
sentencing role from juries and assigning it to judges.
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tation, compulsory process, and, ultimately, the right to counsel evolved
at least in part as counterweights to a substantive criminal law that
threatened death in proportions that the public-and sometimes the judiciary-could not tolerate. An adversarial system evolved in eighteenthcentury England not so much because it was a superior process for finding the truth, but at least partly because it served the "truth-defeating"
function of avoiding death where the facts called for hanging. Professor
Langbein's detailed history of the adversary system draws a clear parallel
between England's Bloody Code and the development of the rights associated with adversarial trial:
English criminal justice threatened more capital punishment
than those who administered it were willing to impose. To avoid
a bloodbath, evasions of many sorts were practiced. Adversary
criminal trial procedure was shaped in this milieu, absorbing
what [foreign observers] saw as indifference to truth. If we are
to understand why the Anglo-American criminal procedure that
emerged in this period is so truth-disserving, we must bear in
mind that we settled on our procedures for criminal adjudication at a moment when we did not want all that much truth. 274
An adversarial system emerged in England not so much because it
insured accurate results, but because it equipped a defendant with tools
to fight the mechanism that sought to kill him. Americans of the revolutionary generation embraced these adversarial rights.2 75 Indeed, as of
1791, Americans were a step ahead of their English brethren. When
Americans adopted the Sixth Amendment, England only allowed counsel
to play an extremely limited role in felony cases, where life was at stake,
while permitting counsel for misdemeanors, where death was not at issue. 276 Both American colonial practice and the Sixth Amendment rejected that limit.27 7 In effect, by expanding upon existing common law
practice, the Framers declared that the adversarial rights enshrined in the
Sixth Amendment belonged at the heart of the proceeding that determined life and death. And in the Framers' world, that proceeding was a
single, unified trial with no separate sentencing.
3. Another View of Judicial Sentencing Discretion in the Framers' World:
Noncapital Sentencing. - In Williams v. New York, the Court felt free to
disregard trial rights at sentencing in part because
274. Langbein, Origins, supra note 30, at 336.
275. "[T]he right[s] articulated in the Sixth Amendment . . . are not designed to
make trustworthiness the defining principle. Rather, the central principle is that the
Framers chose an adversarial system . . . ." Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation
Clause and Hearsay Doctrine Under the Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions,
1993 U. Ill. L. Rev. 691, 754.
276. Jonakait, supra note 243, at 82-84 ("A defense attorney could help present legal
arguments, but could not present evidence, examine or cross-examine witnesses, or
address the jury in opening or closing statements." (footnote omitted)).
277. Id. at 94-96.
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both before and since the American colonies became a nation,
courts in this country and in England practiced a policy under
which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide discretion in the
sources and types of evidence used to assist him in determining
the kind and2 extent
of punishment to be imposed within limits
78
fixed by law.
As we have seen, at least when it comes to sentencing that involves a
choice between life and death, that conclusion has no support in our
constitutional history. 2 7 9 Both judicial discretion in capital sentencing
and the notion that capital sentencing information might be presented
outside of an adversarial trial are post-constitutional phenomena.
There is, however, a different history for sentencing decisions that
did not call for death. At common law, misdemeanors by definition were
not capital offenses; punishment for a misdemeanor could not "touch life
or limb. ''28 0 Though the absence of prison cells made terms of imprisonment relatively rare until the late eighteenth century, English and colonial American judges still exercised a range of discretion in choosing
punishment for misdemeanants. Fines and whipping were among the judicial options. 2 81 The eighteenth-century English and American authorities cited in Williams2 8 2 do suggest that judges exercised sentencing
discretion in choosing among these kinds of punishments and in
fixing terms of imprisonment, and that they exercised that discretion
283
in sentencing proceedings that lacked the formality of jury trials.
278. 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949).
279. See supra text accompanying notes 249-253.
280. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 480 n.7 (2000) (quotingJ.H. Baker, An
Introduction to English Legal History 584 (3d ed. 1990)).
281. Id.
282. Williams, 337 U.S. at 246 n.5 (citing Annotation, Right of Court in Imposing
Sentence to Consider Other Offenses Committed by Defendant, in Absence of Statute in
that Regard, 86 A.L.R. 832, 832-39 (1933); Annotation, Right of Court to Hear Evidence
for Purpose of Determining Sentence to be Imposed, 77 A.L.R. 1211, 1211-15 (1932);
Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence in Criminal Case after Conviction in Mitigation or
Aggravation of Sentence, 14 Am. & Eng. Cases Ann. 968, 968-70 (1909)). Williams cites
those collected cases to support the view that courts at and before the constitutional period
exercised sentencing discretion in capital cases. While the authorities fail to support that
view, they do offer numerous examples ofjudicial discretion in noncapital cases, especially
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. See, e.g., Tractenberg v. United States, 293
F. 476, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that court's consideration of defendant's prior
convictions in "the imposition of [a] sentence" was a permissible "exercise of ...
discretion" in automobile theft case); Smith v. People, 75 P. 914, 915 (Colo. 1904)
(confirming in perjury case that court possesses discretion "as to the extent of
punishment" and must consider mitigating and aggravating evidence); Tracey v. State, 64
N.W. 1069, 1070 (Neb. 1895) (noting that character evidence in robbery case "may induce
the court 'to temper justice with mercy").
283. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 62, 62 (1796) (noting that affidavits in
mitigation may be presented to court in advance of sentencing defendant convicted of
assault); Rex v. Sharpness, (1786) 99 Eng. Rep. 1066, 1066 (KB.) (allowing prosecutor to
read affidavit in aggravation before sentencing defendant to one month imprisonment on
conviction for crime of "suffering a prisoner to escape").
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But judges were not given the power to choose between life and
28 4
death.
There is even more direct historical evidence that the Framers distinguished capital from noncapital cases in assigning sentencing discretion
to judges. 28 5 The First Congress passed the first federal criminal legislation. That statute included mandatory death penalties for seven offenses. 286 The same statute defined thirteen noncapital offenses for
2 7
which it provided sentencing ranges of fines and imprisonment.
Though the statute does not explicitly identify the sentencing authority
in noncapital cases, contemporary practice 288 suggests that the judge was
to choose within the authorized range of punishments. 28 9 Most critically,
the criminal legislation of the First Congress created no crimes for which
290
a judge might choose between life and death.
The clear distinction that the Framers drew between mandatory penalties for capital convictions and discretionary sentencing for noncapital
offenses is critical when it comes to applying Sixth Amendment trial
rights at sentencing. As legislators, the Framers seemed comfortable entrusting noncapital sentencing to an informal, post-trial sentencing process run by judges. That, after all, had been the common law model for
misdemeanors. But when it came to death, the Framers envisioned a different process. To them, the question of guilt for a capital crime and the
284. None of the eighteenth-century cases relied upon by Williams reflect a capital
sentencing process where the question of life or death was determined by the judge at
sentencing. In a system with mandatory death penalties, that hardly seems a surprise. See
supra text accompanying notes 256-265. There were, however, other outlets for mercy in
the years leading up to the creation of the Federal Constitution. Along with the
inconsistent practice of avoiding execution for some crimes by awarding "benefit of clergy"
to first-time offenders, see Banner, supra note 30, at 62-64, the process of executive
pardon was exercised more freely then than in the modern age, see Myers, supra note 253,
at 792.
285. For the notion that the Framers embraced judicial sentencing discretion, rather
than fixed penalties for all crimes, I am indebted to Professor Rory Little, who made this
point in a Blakely filing. See Petition for Rehearing on Behalf of the State of Washington at
*2-*4, Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) (No. 02-1632) 2004 WL 1686266.
286. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, §§ 1 (treason), 3 (murder), 8 (piracy), 9 (piracy), 10
(accessories), 14 (forgery), 23 (aiding escape of person convicted of any capital crime), 1
Stat. 112, 112-17.
287. Id. §§ 2 (misprision of treason), 5 (rescue of body after execution), 6 (misprision
of felony), 7 (manslaughter), 11 (concealing a pirate), 12 (confederacy to become
pirates), 13 (maiming), 15 (stealing or falsifying court records), 16 (larceny), 17 (receiving
stolen goods), 18 (perjury), 21 (bribery), 22 (obstruction of process).
288. See supra note 283.
289. Other criminal legislation passed by the First Congress explicitly vested judges
with noncapital sentencing discretion. See Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 66, 1 Stat. 175,
175-76 (providing for "fine or imprisonment, or both, in the discretion of the court...
the fine shall not exceed one thousand dollars, and the term of imprisonment shall not
exceed twelve months" in cases of certain customs offenses).
290. Indeed, that legislation abolished the "benefit of clergy," a sentencing practice
that English courts sometimes had used to avoid imposing otherwise mandatory death
sentences. See Act of Apr. 30, 1790 § 31, 1 Stat. at 119.
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question of death remained inseparable. And they left both questions to
29 1
juries in the context of a trial featuring full adversarial rights.
4. Bifurcated Trials: The Evolution of Sentencing as a Separate Proceeding.
When the Sixth Amendment was written, juries decided the question
of guilt and the question of death in a single proceeding governed by the
adversarial rules of trial. That unified system gradually gave way, the first
signs of the erosion coming shortly after the new nation was formed when
states began to question the range of capital crimes. 29 2 Three forces
slowly changed the landscape of sentencing: (1) a growing aversion to
the death penalty; 29 3 (2) the development of prisons as a sentencing alternative; 294 and (3) an emerging penology that focused on the individualization of punishment.

29 5

By the mid-nineteenth century, these three forces had "produced a
general shift in this country from criminal statutes 'providing fixed-term
sentences to those providing judges discretion within a permissible
range."' 29 6 Along with judicial discretion and individualization of
sentences came a need for information. If judges were to tailor their
sentences to fit individual offenders, they needed to know more about
that individual than a trial-or guilty plea-was likely to tell them. The
question at trial was whether the defendant committed the offense, not
whether the defendant was a bad person. At trial, evidence relating to
the offense was relevant, while evidence of a defendant's bad character

was regarded as unfairly prejudicial. 297 The restrictive rules of evidence
at trial conflicted with the emerging preference for making the punishment fit not only the crime, but also the individual criminal.

291. The same criminal legislation that established the first federal capital offenses
also specified a full range of adversarial rights for defendants in capital cases, including the
rights to appointed counsel, to a copy of the indictment, to a jury list in advance of trial,
and to compel the attendance of witnesses. See id. § 29, 1 Stat. at 118-19.
292. See Banner, supra note 30, at 94-97.
293. From the 1790s through the mid-nineteenth century, the number of capital
offenses declined dramatically. See id. at 94-100; Myers, supra note 253, at 791-92.
294. See Banner, supra note 30, at 99, 102 (describing historical shift from death
penalty to use of prisons); see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 480 n.7 (2000)
(noting that "until the late 18th century... 'the idea of prison as a punishment would have
seemed an absurd expense'" (quoting J.H. Baker, Criminal Courts and Procedure at
Common Law 1550-1800, in Crime in England 1550-1800, at 15, 43 (J.S. Cockburn ed.,
1977))).
295. Individualization of punishment gained momentum throughout the nineteenth
century, reflecting a "scientific" view that crime was a form of sickness that might be cured
with proper treatment of an individual. See Banner, supra note 30, at 102-03 (explaining
emerging viewpoint that criminals were product of "malign influence beyond [their]
control"); Myers, supra note 253, at 792 n.19 (noting that punishment began to be tailored
to fit the individual crime).
296. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 558 (2002) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at
481).
297. See generally Note, Admissibility, supra note 58, at 716 (highlighting importance
of evidence about defendant's character in determining proper sentence).
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The solution to that conflict was bifurcation, a process that evolved
naturally from the parallel movements toward judicial discretion and individualization. By the middle of the twentieth century, the bifurcated
process which we regard as typical today-a guilty plea or a jury trial concluding in a guilty verdict, followed by a separate sentencing before the
29 8
court-was gaining widespread acceptance in noncapital sentencing.
Separation of trial and sentencing followed a different path in the
world of capital litigation. As we have seen, eighteenth-century juries exercised effective control over death sentencing through their power to
issue general verdicts. 29 9 The result, in many cases, was acquittal of factually guilty defendants whom juries were unwilling to condemn to the gallows. Legislatures reacted to this form ofjury nullification in two ways. In
many jurisdictions, they reduced the number of capital offenses 30 0 or
redefined homicide crimes to allow noncapital options.3 0 1 In others,
they explicitly authorized juries to choose between life and death for serious felonies. 30 2 Throughout the nineteenth century, several states and
the federal government passed statutes allowing juries to issue verdicts
30 3
that explicitly chose death, or something less, as punishment.
Despite the spread of formalized sentencing discretion, most jurisdictions continued to conduct unitary capital trials. Bifurcation came to
capital cases much more slowly than to noncapital cases. In 1957, California became the first state to bifurcate capital cases into guilt and sentencing phases. 30 4 As late as 1970, only six states had laws separating the guilt
30 5
phase of a capital case from the sentencing phase.
That changed abruptly in the mid-1970s. First, Furman v. Georgia effectively invalidated every death-penalty statute in the nation. 30 6 In response, state legislatures revised their statutes in an effort to limit and
channel sentencing discretion. Then, in Woodson v. North Carolina, the
Court struck down a statute which mandated the death penalty for firstdegree murder. 30 7 The companion case, Gregg v. Georgia, built on Wood298. See id. at 721 (advocating, in 1942, a more widespread acceptance of
bifurcation). Williams itself reflects this modern approach to sentencing. In effect,
Williams treats the evolving twentieth-century norm in noncapital cases as if it were the
"age-old practice" for capital cases. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250-51 (1949).
299. See supra text accompanying notes 263-273.
300. See Banner, supra note 30, at 131-32 (highlighting state legislation that
decreased the number of crimes punishable by death).
301. See Winston v. United States, 172 U.S. 303, 310-11 (1899).
302. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 199-200 (1971); Andres v. United
States, 333 U.S. 740, 753 (1948); Winston, 172 U.S. at 310-11.
303. See Winston, 172 U.S. at 310-11. The federal statute provided that "thejury may
qualify their verdict by adding thereto 'without capital punishment.'" Act of Jan. 15, 1897,
ch. 29, § 1, 29 Stat. 487, 487.
304. See Act of Sept. 11, 1957, 1957 Cal. Stat. 1968 (replaced by Cal. Penal Code
§ 190.1 (1973)), cited in Myers, supra note 253, at 795 n.38.
305. See McGautha, 402 U.S. at 208 & n.19.
306. 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972).
307. 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976); see also supra note 177.
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son's theme of individualization. 30 8 In order to make an individualized
determination that death is the appropriate punishment, the Court
noted, a sentencer has a "vital need" for information concerning "the
character and individual circumstances" of the defendant. 30 9 But that
kind of information presents "special problems" at a unified trial, where
it may be irrelevant to the issue of guilt and highly prejudicial to the
defendant. 3 10 The solution, the Court suggested, is bifurcation. Relying
heavily on procedures outlined in the Model Penal Code,3 11 Gregg
concluded:
As a general proposition, these concerns are best met by a system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is apprised of the information relevant to the
imposition of sentence and
provided with standards to guide its
3 12
use of the information.
Though Gregg did not hold that bifurcation was constitutionally mandated, no state legislature since Gregg has been willing to risk a departure
from the best practice outlined there by the Court. Today, every American death-penalty statute separates capital cases into at least two parts: a
313
guilt phase and a penalty phase.
This brief history of bifurcated trials offers important insights when
we try to interpret the Sixth Amendment. When our Constitution was
written, a capital case consisted of a unified trial in which a jury considered the question of life or death as inseparable from the question of
guilt, and in which a defendant enjoyed full adversarial trial rights
throughout.3 1 4 It was largely after the framing that the unified world
evolved into two separate worlds. That evolution started much earlier,
and advanced much faster, in the case of noncapital trials. And the movement toward bifurcated trials was part of a movement away from the death
penalty. The very notion of a separate sentencing proceeding with lesser
rights than at trial evolved only where death was not at issue.
The constitutional instinct to maintain jury control over questions of
life and death was so strong that unified proceedings persisted in capital
cases long after they began to disappear in noncapital cases. In noncapital cases, judicial sentencing had provided a kind of natural bifurcation.3 1 5 But without a separate sentencer in capital cases, there was no inclination toward a separate sentencing. And, of course, without a separate
308. See 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
309. Id. at 189-90 & n.38 (plurality opinion).
310. Id. at 190.
311. Id. at 191 (citing Model Penal Code § 201.6 cmrt. 5 (Tentative Draft No. 9,
1959)).
312. Id. at 195.
313. See Kelly, supra note 7, at 428; Myers, supra note 253, at 787.
314. See supra notes 253-255 and accompanying text.
315. See Myers, supra note 253, at 794 ("[J]udicial sentencing in itself contained a
concept of bifurcation.").
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sentencing proceeding, there was no distinction between "trial rights"
and "sentencing rights."
After almost two hundred years of capital sentencings governed by
full, adversarial trial rights, it took the Eighth Amendment revolution
spawned by Furman to break apart the unified world of capital cases. And
once that happened, bifurcated capital cases raised new questions about
sentencing rights, questions that were seldom at issue in a unified world.
Further, Woodson's requirement of individualization and the corresponding need for broader information put new pressures on adversarial trial
rights that could limit sentencing information. In sum, the Eighth
Amendment revolution created both new opportunities and new reasons
to limit Sixth Amendment rights at capital sentencing. Ironically, a constitutional movement that sought to limit the state's power to impose
death had also limited the adversarial rights of defendants who confronted death.
C. Drawing New Conclusions from the Framers' World
From its cursory look at history, Williams purports to find an "age-old
practice" ofjudicial discretion in sentencing based on "information from
out-of-court sources."3 16 While that view may reflect historical practice in
misdemeanor cases,3 1 7 and nineteenth-century practice in a broader
range of noncapital cases,31 8 it is quite distant from the reality of capital
litigation in the Framers' era. The Framers' practice featured mandatory
death penalties imposed pursuant to jury verdicts in unitary proceedings
conducted as full adversarial trials. Williams's notion of unchecked judicial discretion in capital sentencing would have been foreign-and, I believe, downright frightening-to the Framers.
Years later, the Court drifted closer to historical accuracy in Apprendi.
There, the Court at least recognized the "sanction-specific" nature of
eighteenth-century criminal law. 3 19 But Apprendi, and later Ring, made
more of that history than it will bear. Because, historically, a jury's felony
verdict effectively authorized the punishment fixed by law for a given offense, the Apprendi Court concluded that the jury's constitutional role is
to find any fact necessary to subject a defendant to the maximum penalty
prescribed by statute.3 20 Then, by way of dictum, the Court added, "nothing in this history suggests that it is impermissible for judges to exercise
discretion .. .in imposing a judgment within the range prescribed by statute." 32 1 In other words, the Court decided that the Sixth Amendment
world of "trial rights" ends when we find all the facts sufficient to impose
316.
317.
318.
319.
Criminal
320.
321.

Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250-51 (1949).
See supra notes 280-283 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 296-298.
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 479 (2000) (quoting Langbein, English
Trial Jury, supra note 34, at 36-37).
Id. at 482-83.
Id. at 481.
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a given penalty. But the discretionary world of sentencing can operate
under different rules. A few years later, Ring imported the same analysis
into the capital sentencing process, extending the jury right to any
factfinding that renders a defendant eligible for the maximum penalty of
death, but leaving the final selection decision outside Sixth Amendment
protection .322
In relation to history, Apprendi and Ring make sense, but only to a
point. History certainly supports the view that Sixth Amendment protections were intended to protect a defendant during the adjudication of
facts that could lead to a prescribed, or maximum, punishment. And, for
sentencings that did not involve death, history supports the exercise of
judicial sentencing discretion outside of the adversarial trial process: the
kind of sentencing discretion that existed in misdemeanor cases at the
time of the founding. But, when it comes to capital cases, there is no
historical support for the line that Ring attempts to draw between
factfinding to establish death eligibility, on the one hand, and tie ultimate sentencing, or selection decision, on the other. There simply was
no eighteenth-century practice that limited juries to a purely factfinding
role, while granting judges the ultimate power to choose a death sentence. 323 To the contrary, in 1791-and indeed for more than a century
thereafter-the unified nature of capital trials left the ultimate decision
of life or death in the hands of juries.
Viewed through the lens of history, Ring's line drawing is wrong on
two counts. First, like Williams, it assumes a discretionary role for judges
in capital sentencing that did not exist in the Framers' world. Second, it
ignores the de facto sentencing discretion exercised byjuries. In excluding capital-case juries from the ultimate choice of life or death, the Court
overlooks both the historical purpose of the general verdict and the most
celebrated exercise of that power by juries. In England and colonial
America, juries stood as a form of popular resistance to unpopular
laws. 32 4 Nowhere was that power more important, and more frequently
exercised, than in resisting the imposition of death sentences under an
unpopular criminal code.
The power to issue general verdicts effectively turned juries into sentencing bodies in capital cases, and juries exercised that power as an indi322. See supra text accompanying notes 185-190.
323. See supra text accompanying notes 249-253, 263-273. Indeed, in another
context, the Court has stated that there is "absolutely no historical support" for the notion
that the jury's role is limited to determining "factual components of the essential elements"
of a crime. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 512 (1995) (holding that "materiality" of
false statement in perjury prosecution must be determined by jury). The Gaudin Court
rejected the concept of the criminal jury as "mere factfinder," and confirmed that "the
jury's constitutional responsibility is not merely to determine the facts, but to apply the law
to those facts." Id. at 514.
324. See Barkow, supra note 268, at 37 (describing jury's power to issue a general
verdict as "a critical check on the government" and "a mechanism for correcting
overinclusive general criminal laws"); see also supra text accompanying notes 263-273.
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visible element of the unitary capital trial envisioned by the Sixth Amendment. Read in light of history, the constitutional text suggests that all of
the rights we now associate with trial were intended to govern all of the
proceedings that lead to a death sentence. In capital cases, the world of
trial and the world of sentencing are one.
D. What "TrialRights" Belong in a CapitalSentencing?
Today, Eighth Amendment case law has established a death sentencing structure different than the unitary trials known to the Framers.
Moreover, Eighth Amendment values have shaped the Court's decisions
limiting Sixth Amendment rights at capital sentencing. The Court's rejection of the right to jury sentencing, for example, rests in part on the
notion thatjury sentencing conflicts with the Eighth Amendment goals of
consistency and proportionality. 325 Gregg and later Eighth Amendment
rulings call for a breadth of information at capital sentencing that may
conflict with limits on hearsay under the Confrontation Clause.3 26 In
thinking about a unified world of Sixth Amendment rights for capital
cases, we need to consider not just the world of the Framers, but the
modern world of capital sentencing as well. We need to ask whether trial
rights belong in the modern world of capital sentencing created by
Furman and its Eighth Amendment offspring.
1. The Artificial Line Between Factfinding and Selection. - Current
Eighth Amendment doctrine divides capital sentencing into two tasks:
(1)determining death eligibility, and (2) selecting which eligible defendants most deserve death. Under Eighth Amendment theory, this division
of sentencing labor is supposed to (a) avoid arbitrary results by narrowing
the range of defendants facing death, and (b) produce reliable judgments that death is "appropriate" in a given case. 3 27 Ring realigned the
Sixth Amendment world to match these Eighth Amendment divisions:
assigning eligibility to the world of jury trial while leaving selection to a
judge under the more fluid rules of the sentencing world.
This Sixth Amendment division of sentencing labor has a serious
practical deficiency: The line is artificial. Assigning eligibility to one sentencer and selection to another fails to account for the significant overlap
between the two. Much factfinding is a matter of degree. When a jury
makes an eligibility decision by finding that a murder was "especially heinous," how heinous does that mean? When a different sentencer weighs
that fact, how much weight should it then receive? Factfinding can be a
matter of degree in another sense. Ajury may find a fact beyond a rea325. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 (1976) (highlighting consistency
advantages of judicial sentencing).
326. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190-92 (1976) (urging that information
relevant to sentencing decisions be made admissible by instituting a bifurcated trial).
327. For a more thorough description and analysis of the Court's Eighth Amendment
doctrine of "guided discretion" in the decades after Furman, see Steiker & Steiker, Sober
Second Thoughts, supra note 8, at 361-71.
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sonable doubt, for purposes of guilt or death eligibility, yet still harbor
some uncertainty about that fact. Juries sometimes vote for life to account for those lingering doubts, but a division of sentencing labor cannot account for that subtlety. The sentencing judge cannot weigh the
jury's lingering doubt. He only knows that they have found the fact.
As in a childhood game of "telephone," elements of truth are lost
each time a fact is conveyed from one person to another. The division of
capital sentencing labor suffers from exactly that problem. The unified
theory which I propose at least eliminates the possibility that facts can get
lost in translation. It makes sense, as a constitutional matter, to unify a
decisionmaking process that suffers, as a practical matter, when we try to
divide it.
2. Proportionality and Consistency. - Furman's principal concern was
that death sentencing had become arbitrary. As Justice Stewart famously
remarked, "These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way
that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. 3' 28 A major source of
that arbitrariness, according to Justice White's concurrence in Furman,
329
was that juries exercised sentencing discretion without direction.
When Florida's system of judicial sentencing came before the Court in
the wake of Furman, the Court's response was predictable: "[J]udicial
sentencing should lead ... to even greater consistency in the imposition
at the trial court level of capital punishment, since a trial judge is more
experienced in sentencing than a jury, and therefore is better able to
33 0
impose sentences similar to those imposed in analogous cases."
There are several responses to the notion that capital sentencing by
juries defeats the aim of consistency in applying the death penalty. First,
there is no evidence that judges are any more consistent than juries in
distinguishing "appropriate" cases for capital punishment. 331 Individual
judges are no less likely than individual jurors to be influenced by their
own experiences, fears, personal morality, religion, politics, or any of the
many circumstances that may affect sentencing judgments. 332 Indeed,
the perceived inconsistency of judges in noncapital sentencing was re328. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring).
329. See id. at 314 (White, J., concurring) (noting "the recurring practice of
delegating sentencing authority to the jury and the fact that ajury... may refuse to impose
the death penalty no matter what the circumstances of the crime").
330. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 252.
331. And, as we have seen, the notion-imbedded in Willias-that judges and
probation officers bring to sentencing an expertise in matters of offender rehabilitation is
a notion that has no application to a death sentence. See supra text accompanying notes
60-64.
332. Political pressures in highly publicized cases pose special dangers in jurisdictions
where judges are elected. See Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 519-20 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("The danger that [elected judges] will bend to political pressures when
pronouncing sentence in highly publicized capital cases is the same danger confronted by
judges beholden to King George III.").
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333
sponsible for a nationwide movement toward mandatory guidelines.
The popular image of a "hanging judge" would not exist without the contrast provided by others less willing to call for a rope.
Second, acknowledging the jury's constitutional role in capital sentencing does not mean removing the judge from the process. The Sixth
Amendment, I suggest, commands that no capital sentence may be imposed without a jury verdict that calls for death. But no constitutional
rule forbids judges from reviewing jury-issued death verdicts and mitigating those that appear aberrational. Indeed, that kind of review already
occurs at both the trial and appellate levels under state statutes 334 and
335
under the FDPA.
Finally, while there is no evidence that judges are more consistent
than juries in selecting appropriate candidates for death, there is considerable evidence that the division of sentencing labor leads to disagreements between judges and juries. Our current constitutional order not
only permits judges to determine death sentences, it allows them to do so
by "overriding" jury recommendations to the contrary. 33 6 In the handful
of death-penalty jurisdictions that allow the override practice, experience
shows that judges frequently exercise the authority to impose death
3 37
where juries have voted for life.

A unified theory applying full Sixth Amendment protection throughout the capital sentencing process would eliminate that practice. No one
can say that the results would, or would not be, more appropriate, but
eliminating the override procedure would at least dispense with inconsistent judgments in a single case. The current practice, which amounts to
disregarding jury verdicts, does nothing to promote public respect for the
institution of trial by jury.
3. Confrontation, Rules of Evidence, and Reliable Sentencing Information.
Aside from requiring jury sentencing, the principal impact of a unified
theory would be to require confrontation at capital sentencing which, in
turn, would restrict the prosecution's reliance on hearsay. Williams rejected that idea because, the Court claimed, "most of the information
now relied upon by judges to guide them in the intelligent imposition of
333. See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 783-86 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting
in part) (recounting history of movement toward guideline sentencing).
334. See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.5 (2004) (permitting court, after review of
presentence report, to set aside jury verdict of death and impose life imprisonment).
335. See 18 U.S.C. § 3595(c) (2000) (permitting court of appeals to remand case
when it finds that "the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion,
prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor").
336. See Harris, 513 U.S. at 509-12 (holding that sentencing judge may treat jury's
decision as an "advisory verdict" and that state need not determine what weight judge
places on this verdict).
337. In his dissent in Harris, for example, Justice Stevens noted forty-seven cases
where Alabama judges had imposed death in the face ofjury recommendations for life. Id.
at 521. In Florida from 1972 to early 1992, 134 death sentences resulted from similar
judicial overrides. Id. at 521 n.8.
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sentences would be unavailable if information were restricted to that
given in open court by witnesses subject to cross-examination."3 38
The notion that trial rights will unduly limit the flow of capital-sentencing information is wrong for a variety of reasons. First, experience
tells us that trial-like proceedings work at capital sentencing. Most states
already provide for jury sentencing. 339 Some states-including very active death-penalty jurisdictions-conduct sentencing hearings pursuant
to their normal rules of evidence, including their restrictions on hearsay.3 40 Yet nothing in the experience of those states suggests that their
proceedings have been handicapped by a dearth of information.
Second, the alternative to adversarial trial rights has its own imperfections. Williams approved a capital-sentencing process that reduced
factfinding to the conclusions in a probation officer's presentence report.
Despite the professionalism of most probation officers, by training and
experience they tend not to be well equipped for the role of an independent investigator. 341 Their principal source of information often turns
out to be the files of the prosecutor and police. Nothing in that model
suggests that it is likely to produce more, or better, sentencing information than a process that leaves fact investigation and presentation to the
adversarial process. 342 Moreover, to the extent that presentence investigations produce useful information, nothing in the Sixth Amendment
prevents that information from being provided to the parties and
presented through live testimony subject to cross-examination. Nor is a
court prevented from relying on a presentence report when considering
whether to impose a death sentence already approved by a jury at an
3 43
adversarial hearing.
Third, applying the Sixth Amendment to capital sentencing need
not limit sentencing information to that admissible under the law of evidence. Most rules of evidence are not constitutionally required. 344 Con338. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250 (1949).
339. When Ring was decided, twenty-nine of the thirty-eight death-penalty states left
capital sentencing to juries. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 608 n.6 (2002). Since Ring,
four more states have moved to jury sentencing throughout all stages of capital sentencing.
See Shapiro, supra note 20, at 647-50.
340. Louisiana, Missouri, and Virginia all have death-penalty statutes expressly
providing that the rules of evidence for trials also govern capital sentencings. Kelly, supra
note 7, at 437.
341. See Sharon M. Bunzel, Note, The Probation Officer and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Strange Philosophical Bedfellows, 104 Yale L.J. 933, 961-62 (1995) (noting
that probation officers are not well trained or well suited to roles of factfinder and
investigator thrust upon them by guideline sentencing).
342. Cf. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2542 (2004) (criticizing fairness of
process that elevates defendant's maximum sentence "not on facts proved to his peers
beyond a reasonable doubt, but on facts extracted after trial from a report compiled by a
probation officer who the judge thinks more likely got it right than got it wrong").
343. See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.5 (2004).
344. See, e.g., Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352-54 (1990) (holding that
admitting evidence in violation of Federal Rules of Evidence did not violate defendant's
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sistent with the Sixth Amendment, states are free to suspend their normal
rules of evidence to accommodate a broad range of information relevant
to a defendant's character or his crime.
The Sixth Amendment would limit hearsay at capital sentencing, but
only to the extent such hearsay violates the Confrontation Clause. Applying current confrontation-hearsay doctrine to the sentencing process
would prohibit the government from relying on "testimonial" hearsay
statements to support a death sentence. 345 Under Crawford v. Washington,
"testimonial" hearsay includes most statements made to law enforcement
officers investigating a crime. 346 Hence, at sentencing, Crawford would
prohibit police from summarizing that information for the jury. It would
also prohibit use at capital sentencing of a presentence report collecting
that hearsay from government files.
Still, in many cases, applying Crawford's confrontation principles at
capital sentencing need not limit the information available to a sentencer. Where a hearsay declarant is available to testify, Crawford merely
requires the government to present that information in a different, albeit
less convenient, form: through the live testimony of the witness with direct knowledge of the facts. And when the witness testifies, the Confrontation Clause becomes a rule of inclusion rather than exclusion, guaranteeing the right to develop further information on cross-examination.
Thus, the result of confrontation at capital sentencing may be more, not
less, information. 347 The cost may be no more than time and inconvenience. The benefit is preserving a defendant's right to test government
348
evidence.
No doubt confrontation rights would keep some information out of
some sentencings. Where the original source of "testimonial" hearsay is
unavailable, there may be no means to put that information before a sentencer without depriving a defendant of an opportunity to cross-examine
the source. In the end, however, that is the same dilemma that the Confrontation Clause presents at the guilt phase. When it comes to determining guilt or innocence, the Crawford Court resolved that dilemma in
due process rights); United States v. Fell, 360 F.3d 135, 144-45 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that
Federal Rules of Evidence "establish neither the floor nor the ceiling of constitutionally
permissible evidence").
345. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004).
346. Id.
347. The Confrontation Clause operates in many respects as a rule including, rather
than excluding, evidence. See generally, John G. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility: Real
Confrontation, Virtual Cross-examination, and the Right to Confront Hearsay, 67 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 191 (1999).
348. Similarly, guaranteeing the right of compulsory process at capital sentencing
would add, not remove, information available to the sentencer. The Compulsory Process
Clause prohibits some state evidentiary rules that unfairly restrict exculpatory evidence.
See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 300-02 (1973) (holding that exclusion of
trustworthy evidence violated "fundamental standards of due process"); Washington v.
Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967) (holding that petitioner was denied due process where state
rule prevented him from calling defense witness).
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favor of confrontation. Crawford singled out "testimonial" hearsay in part
because "[i] nvolvement of government officers in the production of testimony with an eye toward trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial
abuse. '3 49 The same potential for abuse is present when police and prosecutors collect out-of-court statements that purport to show that a particular defendant is more deserving of death than are others. 350 The answer, under the Confrontation Clause, should be the same when
defendant is confronting death.
CONCLUSION

The Sixth Amendment was intended to equip a defendant with adversarial tools to challenge the mechanism of government that sought his
death. Today, we divide that mechanism into a guilt phase, an eligibility
determination, and a final selection decision. But those divisions did not
exist in the Framers' world. They exist today to serve Eighth Amendment
goals. They should not, and need not, limit the reach of the Sixth
Amendment.
Williams v. New York proclaimed that capital sentencing is more reliable without trial rights. Faith in our adversarial system should lead us to
question that claim. But even if it were true, that would be insufficient
reason to limit Sixth Amendment rights at capital sentencings. The
Framers had more than reliability in mind when they adopted the Sixth
Amendment. They lived in a world of mandatory penalties where "too
much truth brought too much death. '35 1 They were willing to sacrifice
accurate factfinding for fair verdicts that reflected the considered judgment of ajury of their peers. They crafted the Sixth Amendment notjust
to protect the innocent from punishment, but to protect the guilty from
undeserved death.
349. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56,n.7.
350. Indeed, at the sentencing phase, police-generated testimonial hearsay may
appear most often in the form of summary testimony relating to a defendant's uncharged
prior crimes. See, e.g., Hatch v. Oklahoma, 58 F.3d 1447, 1465 (10th Cir. 1995) (relying
on Williams and concluding that unadjudicated crimes may be considered in capital
sentencing).

In that context, the "unique potential" for abuse is magnified because such

crimes may be distant in time, may never have passed the probable cause determination of
a magistrate or grand jury, and indeed may have remained uncharged precisely because
they were not readily subject to proof.

351. Langbein, Origins, supra note 30, at 334.

